In Re: Prudential Insur. by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-23-1998 
In Re: Prudential Insur. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Prudential Insur." (1998). 1998 Decisions. 169. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/169 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Volume 1 of 2 
 
Filed July 23, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 97-5155, 97-5156, 97-5217 & 97-5312 
 
IN RE: PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
AMERICA SALES PRACTICE LITIGATION AGENT ACTIONS 
 
RICHARD P. KRELL, MDL transfer, N.D. Ohio, 
DNJ Civil Action No. 95-6062 
 
v. 
 
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 
 
       Richard P. Krell, as well as Objectors 
       Elizabeth Bajek, Amanda Bajek, 
       Helen Bartsch, Mark Ciconte, 
       Raymond Dolce, Margaret Dolice, 
       Louise Duggan, Peter Duggan, 
       Charles Duncan, Mary Howe, Mary Krell, 
       William Morris, Diana Racer, Thomas Racer, 
       Gweneth Reidel, The Estate of Carl J. Scalzo, 
       Marie Scalzo, Terry Sligar, Alice Smith, 
       Jerry Smith, and William Walton, 
       Appellants at Nos. 97-5155/5156/5312 
 
IN RE: PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
AMERICA SALES PRACTICE LITIGATION AGENT ACTIONS 
 
RICHARD JOHNSON, 
Intervenor-Plaintiff in District Court 
 
       Richard E. Johnson, 
       Appellant at No. 97-5217 
 
 
 
  
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 95-cv-04704) 
 
Argued January 26, 1998 
 
Before: SCIRICA, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed July 23, 1998) 
 
       MICHAEL P. MALAKOFF, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Malakoff, Doyle & Finberg 
       The Frick Building, Suite 200 
       Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 
 
        Attorney for Appellants, 
        Richard P. Krell, et al. 
 
       LYNDE SELDEN, II, ESQUIRE 
       Lynde Selden Chartered 
       501 West Broadway, Suite 845 
       San Diego, California 92101 
 
        Attorney for Appellant, 
        Richard E. Johnson 
 
       MELVYN I. WEISS, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & 
        Lerach 
       One Penn Plaza, 49th Floor 
       New York, New York 10119 
 
       ALLYN Z. LITE, ESQUIRE 
       Goldstein, Lite & DePalma 
       Two Gateway Center, 12th Floor 
       Newark, New Jersey 07102 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee, 
        George A. Zoller, Class Action 
        Plaintiff Representative 
 
                                2 
  
       REID L. ASHINOFF, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       MICHAEL H. BARR, ESQUIRE 
       Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal 
       1221 Avenue of the Americas, 
        24th Floor 
       New York, New York 10020 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees, 
        The Prudential Insurance 
        Company of America and 
        Ron D. Barbaro 
 
       BRIAN S. WOLFMAN, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       ALAN B. MORRISON, ESQUIRE 
       Public Citizen Litigation Group 
       1600 20th Street, N.W. 
       Washington, D.C. 20009 
 
        Attorneys for Amicus Curiae- 
        Appellant, Public Citizen, Inc. 
 
       JOHN J. GIBBONS, ESQUIRE 
       Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger 
        & Vecchione 
       One Riverfront Plaza 
       Newark, New Jersey 07102-5497 
 
        Attorney for Appellee, 
        Robert C. Winters 
 
       FREDERICK B. LACEY, ESQUIRE 
       LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae 
       One Riverfront Plaza 
       Newark, New Jersey 07102 
 
        Attorney for Appellee, 
        Frances K. Beck, as Executrix of 
        the Estate of Robert A. Beck 
 
                                3 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                                        6 
 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY                        8 
 A. The Multi-State Life Insurance Task Force              8 
 B. The Federal Class Action                               11 
  1. The Proposed Settlement                               16 
   a. The Alternative Dispute Resolution process           17 
   b. Basic Claim Relief                                   20 
   c. Enhancements To the Task Force Plan                  20 
  2. The Fairness Hearing                                  23 
 
II. ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
       REVIEW                                              25 
 
III. JURISDICTION                                          26 
 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction                            26 
  1. Federal Question Jurisdiction as a Basis for 
       Supplemental Jurisdiction                           28 
  2. Diversity Jurisdiction as a Basis for Supplemental 
       Jurisdiction                                        34 
 B. Personal Jurisdiction                                  39 
 C. Article III                                            40 
 
IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION                                    42 
 A. Settlement-Only Class Certification                    42 
 B. Class Certification under Rule 23                      45 
  1. The Rule 23(a) Criteria                               46 
   a. Numerosity                                           46 
   b. Commonality                                          47 
   c. Typicality                                           49 
   d. Adequacy of Representation                           52 
  2. The Rule 23(b) Criteria                               55 
   a. Predominance                                         55 
   b. Superiority                                          59 
 C. Conclusion                                             60 
 
V. THE FAIRNESS OF THE PROPOSED 
       SETTLEMENT                                          60 
 A. The Girsh Factors                                      66 
  1. The complexity and duration of the litigation         66 
  2. The reaction of the class to the settlement           66 
  3. The stage of the proceedings and amount of 
       discovery completed                                 68 
 
                                4 
  
  4. The risks of establishing liability and 
       damages                                             69 
   a. Replacement Claims                                   70 
  5. The risks of maintaining the class action 
       through trial                                       72 
  6. The ability of the defendants to withstand a 
       greater judgment                                    73 
  7. The range of reasonableness of the settlement 
       fund in light of the best possible recovery and 
       all the attendant risks of litigation               74 
 B. Other Objections                                       78 
  1. The Rules Enabling Act and the McCarran - 
       Ferguson Act                                        78 
  2. Failure to Allow Discovery                            79 
 C. "Other Sales Claims"                                   80 
  1. The Alleged Expansion of the Class                    81 
  2. Adequacy of Class Notice                              83 
 D. Conclusion                                             87 
 
VI. ATTORNEYS' FEES                                        88 
 A. The Fee Agreement                                      88 
 B. Fee Opinion                                            90 
 C. Analysis                                               96 
  1. "Clear-Sailing" Fee Agreement                         99 
  2. Adverse Effect on Class Members                      101 
  3. Fairness of the Award                                102 
   a. The Value of the Settlement                         102 
   b. The Appropriate Percentage Recovery                 107 
   c. Lodestar Calculation                                110 
    i. Multiplier                                         110 
    ii. Time Records                                      113 
 D. Conclusion                                            114 
 
VII. KRELL'S MOTION TO RECUSE                             114 
 A. Procedural History                                    114 
 B. Legal Standard                                        116 
 C. Krell's Arguments on Appeal                           116 
  1. Ex Parte Meetings                                    116 
  2. The Conference With State Insurance 
       Regulators                                         117 
  3. Rutt v. Prudential                                   119 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION                                          121 
 
                                5 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from the approval of the settlement of 
a nationwide class action lawsuit against Prudential Life 
Insurance Company alleging deceptive sales practices 
affecting over 8 million claimants throughout thefifty states 
and the District of Columbia. 
 
The class is comprised of Prudential policyholders who 
allegedly were the victims of fraudulent and misleading 
sales practices employed by Prudential's sales force. The 
challenged sales practices consisted primarily of churning, 
vanishing premiums and fraudulent investment plans, and 
each cause of action is based on fraud or deceptive 
conduct. There are no allegations of personal injury; there 
are no futures classes. The settlement creates an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism and establishes 
protocols to determine the kind and amount of relief to be 
granted. The relief awarded includes full compensatory 
damages consisting of what plaintiffs thought they were 
purchasing from the insurance agent. There is no cap on 
the amount of compensatory damages for those who 
qualify, and although punitive damages are not included in 
the settlement, Prudential has agreed to pay an additional 
remediation amount in addition to the payments made 
through dispute resolution process. 
 
The case involves five consolidated appeals from the 
judgments of the District Court for the District of New 
Jersey approving the settlement and awarding attorneys' 
fees to class counsel. Appellants, members of the certified 
class who object to the settlement, challenge the district 
court's jurisdiction, the certification of the settlement class, 
the fairness of the settlement itself, the award of attorneys' 
fees, and the district court's refusal to disqualify itself. 
 
We hold the district court properly exercised jurisdiction. 
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is properly grounded on 
the alleged violations of the federal securities laws. 
Although most of the claims implicate state law, 
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supplemental jurisdiction is proper because all of the 
claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact. The 
district court had personal jurisdiction over the class 
because actual notice was given to each of the 8 million 
policyholders by direct mail, and disseminated through 
television, radio and print advertising throughout the fifty 
states and the District of Columbia. We also hold there was 
no reason for the district court to recuse itself from these 
proceedings. 
 
The district court properly certified a national class under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The court assessed the numerosity 
and commonality of the asserted claims, the typicality of 
those claims, and the adequacy of representation provided 
by the named plaintiffs and class counsel, and found they 
satisfied the certification standards. The court also 
concluded the proposed class action was the superior 
means of addressing plaintiffs' claims of widespread sales 
abuse, and the issues common to all members of the class 
predominated over individual issues related to the members 
of the class. 
 
We hold the district court properly evaluated the 
settlement, finding it fair, reasonable and adequate. 
Prudential's deceptive practices occurred nationwide. It may 
be argued that problems national in scope deserve the 
attention of national courts when there is appropriate 
federal jurisdiction. Because of the extraordinary number of 
claims, fairness counsels that plaintiffs similarly injured by 
the same course of deceptive conduct should receive similar 
results with respect to liability and damages. The proposed 
class settlement offers plaintiffs several advantages, 
including full compensation for their injuries, no obligation 
to pay attorneys' fees, and a relatively speedy resolution of 
their claims. The alternative dispute resolution process is 
sensible and provides adequate safeguards for individual 
treatment of claims, including appeals. We will affirm the 
district court's approval of the class certification and the 
settlement. 
 
The district court awarded $90 million in attorneys' fees 
as a percentage of a common fund created under the 
settlement. We will vacate and remand the fee award and 
ask the district court to recalculate the fee to account for 
 
                                7 
  
work done by the multi-state task force whose efforts 
served as a basis for the final settlement in this case. 
Furthermore, we question the multiplier employed in the 
lodestar analysis used by the court to cross check the size 
of the fee award. Although granting discovery on fee 
applications is within the sound discretion of the district 
court, we will ask the district court to reconsider whether 
it should grant limited discovery to the objectors on the fee 
application. 
 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This case began in early 1994, when the first of many 
individual and class action lawsuits alleging improper sales 
and marketing practices was filed against Prudential, the 
nation's largest life insurer. As lawsuits began to 
accumulate, the New Jersey Insurance Commissioner 
sought to organize a group to investigate the allegations 
against Prudential.1 The resulting investigation into market 
conduct sought to determine the scope of any improper 
sales practices, and to develop a remedial plan designed to 
compensate injured policyholders, to prevent future 
violations, and to restore public confidence in the insurance 
industry. Report of The Multi-State Life Insurance Task Force 
and Multi-State Market Conduct Examination of The 
Prudential Insurance Company of America at 2 ("Task Force 
Report"). While the Task Force proceeded with its 
investigation, federal and state court actions alleging sales 
practice abuses by Prudential continued to accumulate. 
Although our primary concern is the outcome of the federal 
litigation, the history of both the Multi-State Life Insurance 
Task Force's investigation and the various lawsuits filed 
against Prudential overlap to a certain degree, and thus 
warrant discussion. 
 
A. The Multi-State Life Insurance Task Force  
 
At the instigation of the New Jersey Insurance 
Commissioner, the Multi-State Life Insurance Task Force 
was formed on April 25, 1995, with the stated goal of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance also conducted 
an independent market conduct investigation of Prudential's New Jersey 
business. Its report was issued on July 9, 1996. 
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conducting a thorough and extensive examination of 
Prudential's sales practices during the period from 1985 
until 1995. In all, thirty states and jurisdictions elected to 
participate.2 The Task Force interviewed 283 agents and 27 
sales management executives, and reviewed voluminous 
materials provided by Prudential. Among those materials 
were internal computer data bases reflecting complaints, 
policy transactions, and agent discipline. The Task Force 
also reviewed market conduct reports prepared by other 
states which had examined Prudential's business practices, 
and examined the historical developments which affected 
sales practices in the insurance industry.3 
 
In July 1996, the Task Force issued its final report, citing 
widespread evidence of fraudulent sales practices and 
inadequate supervision by Prudential's management. It 
explained that Prudential's records revealed the company 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. According to the Task Force Report, eleven states and the District of 
Columbia "actively participated" in the investigation: Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and Washington. These twelve jurisdictions represented 
approximately 36.5 percent of the 10.7 million Prudential policies sold 
during the investigation period. Report of the Multi-State Life Insurance 
Task Force and Multi-State Market Conduct Examination of the Prudential 
Insurance Company of America at 1-2 ("Task Force Report"). The Attorney 
General of the State of Connecticut began a separate investigation of 
Prudential in April 1995, in response to the filing of a class action 
complaint in United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. 
Although the Connecticut Insurance Commissioner subsequently joined 
the Multi-State Task Force, the Attorney General completed its 
independent investigation and issued a report on November 21, 1995. 
 
3. According to the Task Force Report, a combination of regulatory and 
economic changes in the 1970s and 1980s created an atmosphere within 
the insurance industry that was more amenable to the replacement of 
insurance policies. For example, the rise in interest rates allowed 
insurance companies to offer new products "designed to compete with 
banks, money market funds and newly founded life insurers," and thus 
led companies to abandon their usually conservative approach. Task 
Force Report at 7. At the same time, the original model replacement 
regulations, which stated that replacement transactions were generally 
not in the best interest of the customer, were modified to allow for these 
transactions in certain cases. See discussion infra S V.A.4. & n.66. As a 
result of these changes, replacement activity flourished. 
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"knew of cases of alleged misrepresentation and other 
improper sales practices by its agents, and in many 
instances failed to adequately investigate and impose 
effective discipline." Task Force Report at 15. According to 
the report, interviews with Prudential agents revealed "little 
if any consistency in agent training and agent awareness of 
company and regulatory guidelines." Id. at 16. While the 
Task Force concluded that not all of the sales during the 
time period investigated were fraudulent or improper, it 
recognized the difficulty in ascertaining precisely which 
policyholders had been harmed,4 and therefore 
recommended the implementation of a remediation plan 
which would "reach out to all potentially affected 
policyholders." Id. at 17-18. Under the plan, which was 
developed with Prudential's input and cooperation, 
policyholders were given the option of pursuing claims in 
an Alternative Dispute Resolution process ("ADR") or 
through a "no-fault" remedy known as Basic Claim Relief.5 
 
As part of the Task Force Plan, Prudential agreed to 
conduct an extensive outreach program, including 
individual notice to all persons who purchased a policy 
between 1982 and December 31, 1995. Those electing the 
ADR process could submit their claim for evaluation. The 
remediation plan addressed four categories of claims: 
financed or replacement sales; sales involving abbreviated 
payment plans; life insurance sold as an investment; and 
other claims "falling outside of the first three categories." Id. 
at 19. Those electing Basic Claim Relief would be eligible for 
preferred-rate loans or the opportunity to purchase 
discounted policies. 
 
Forty-three states and the District of Columbia signed a 
Consent Order adopting the Task Force Plan, with the 
understanding that if the pending class action achieved a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Task Force found that, "[b]ecause of the nature of the 
transactions and possible improprieties, an electronic analysis could not 
identify every instance of sales abuse or violation of law or regulation." 
Task Force Report at 6. 
 
5. The structure of this remediation plan was based on a settlement 
reached between a number of the class counsel here and New York Life 
Insurance Company in a similar class action. Task Force Report at 198. 
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better result, the Task Force and the states could join in 
the improved plan. The Task Force also recommended a 
separate $35 million fine to be divided among the states 
and the District of Columbia. 
 
B. The Federal Class Action 
 
While the Task Force was conducting its investigation, 
parties continued to file individual claims and class actions 
against Prudential in both state and federal court. On 
February 6, 1995, named plaintiff Nicholson filed a class 
action in Illinois state court which was removed one month 
later to the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Illinois. The Kuchas plaintiffs filed their federal 
class action on February 28, 1995 in the District of 
Connecticut. Four other federal class actions were filed in 
the District of New Jersey in early 1995. Appellant Krell 
filed his class complaint in Ohio state court in June 1995. 
 
On April 26, 1995, Prudential moved to consolidate the 
various federal actions in the District of New Jersey. On 
August 3, 1995, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation granted Prudential's motion and transferred 
several actions to the District of New Jersey.6 Prudential 
then removed the various state actions to federal court, 
including the Krell action, and requested these additional 
cases be consolidated in New Jersey. The MDL Panel 
granted that request as well.7 
 
In October 1995, the district court appointed Melvin 
Weiss of Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach and 
Michael B. Hyman of Much, Shelist, Freed, Deneberg, 
Ament, Bell & Rubenstein as Co-Lead Counsel for plaintiffs, 
and ordered plaintiffs to file a consolidated complaint. On 
October 24, 1995, plaintiffs filed the First Consolidated 
Amended Class Action Complaint. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. More than 100 actions have been centralized in the District of New 
Jersey by the MDL Panel. In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales 
Practice Litigation, 962 F. Supp. 450, 479 n.13 (D.N.J. 1997) ("Fairness 
Opinion"). 
 
7. Appellant Krell moved the district court to remand his case to state 
court. After the district court denied that motion on April 16, 1996, 
Krell 
filed a petition for mandamus relief with this Court. We denied that 
motion without opinion on September 25, 1996. 
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The named plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of all persons 
who purchased new or additional life insurance policies 
between January 1, 1980 and the time of the complaint as 
a result of Prudential's alleged fraudulent scheme. 8 They 
alleged that Prudential management developed and 
implemented a fraudulent scheme to sell life insurance 
policies through a variety of deceptive sales practices, 
including "churning," "vanishing premium," and 
"investment plan" sales tactics. Plaintiffs also challenged 
Prudential's dividend practices, among them the so-called 
"investment generation approach," and "Prudential's 
deceptive administration of class members' policies to 
conceal fraudulent sales and effectuate the scheme, 
including Prudential's use of unauthorized policy loans and 
similar contrivances to deplete policyholders' cash values." 
Lead Counsel Brief at 5. The Complaint alleged violations of 
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, common law fraud, breach of contract, bad faith, 
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, unjust enrichment, 
and breach of state consumer fraud statutes. 
 
On December 26, 1995, Prudential moved to dismiss the 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). At the same time, 
Prudential approached Lead Counsel to discuss a possible 
settlement. Those discussions ended, however, when Lead 
Counsel indicated they would not settle the case without 
significant discovery. The parties renewed their settlement 
discussions in early 1996, after Prudential agreed to 
provide discovery, but once again failed to reach an 
agreement. When the talks ceased, Prudential stopped its 
production of documents. Lead Counsel nevertheless 
pursued its own investigation, interviewing approximately 
thirty former Prudential agents and customers, and 
reviewing the limited array of documents provided by 
Prudential. 
 
The district court granted Prudential's motion in part on 
May 10, 1996, dismissing without prejudice all claims of 
three of the five named plaintiffs, and several claims of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Krell declined to join the class, claiming that Ohio policyholders with 
replacement claims deserved the protection of Ohio insurance law. Krell 
Brief at 5. 
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remaining two. It also noted that plaintiffs would not likely 
prevail on many of their claims at trial. The district court 
then ordered Prudential to provide plaintiffs with copies of 
the substantial discovery materials already provided to the 
Task Force. 
 
Following the issuance of the Task Force Report in July 
1996, Lead Counsel and Prudential once again entered 
settlement negotiations, and again Prudential agreed to 
Lead Counsel's demands for discovery.9  By August 8, 1996, 
Prudential had provided plaintiffs with over 70 boxes of 
documents in response to Lead Counsel's requests. 
 
On September 19, 1996, plaintiffs filed their Second 
Amended Consolidated Complaint. The Second Amended 
Consolidated Complaint contained essentially the same 
claims as the first, alleging Prudential implemented a 
systematic fraudulent marketing scheme which made use 
of false and misleading sales presentations, policy 
illustrations, and marketing materials. Once again, the 
Complaint specifically referred to Prudential's "churning," 
"vanishing premium," and "investment plan" sales tactics.10 
Each of the named plaintiffs claimed to have been injured 
by this common scheme, and alleged one or more of the 
specified sales practices.11 Plaintiffs also sued several 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. According to Lead Counsel, the negotiations then proceeded through 
three stages. The first, from July 6th through August 16th, involved 
preliminary negotiation of the terms of settlement. During the second 
phase, which ran from August 17th through September 22nd, the 
parties negotiated the details of the actual Settlement Agreement. 
Finally, from September 23rd until October 28th, the parties worked out 
the final Stipulation of Settlement. Weiss Aff.P 103. 
 
10. While the Complaint stated that "Prudential's scheme involved [these] 
three notorious deceptive life insurance sales tactics," Second Am. Cons. 
Compl. P 5, the allegations detailed therein also refer to other sales 
abuses which fall outside these three categories. See, e.g., Second Am. 
Cons. Compl. P 89-91 (alleging Prudential took affirmative steps to 
conceal its misrepresentations); P 114-16 (alleging Prudential agents 
informed the Nicholson plaintiffs to "ignore" notices concerning lapses in 
their policies); P 128 (alleging a Prudential agent made unauthorized 
withdrawals from the policy of named plaintiff Dorfner). 
 
11. Carol Nicholson brought suit as executrix of the estate of her 
deceased husband Keith. From 1966 to 1984, the Nicholsons purchased 
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persons in their individual capacities: Robert A. Beck, 
Prudential President from 1972 until 1979 and Chairman 
from 1978 until 1987; Ronald D. Barbaro, Prudential's 
President from 1990 until 1992; and Robert C. Winters, 
Chairman and CEO from 1987 until 1994, and President 
from 1993 until 1994. 
 
According to the Second Amended Consolidated 
Complaint, Prudential was aware of these fraudulent sales 
practices as early as 1982, when internal investigations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
four Prudential policies worth approximately $30,000. In 1986, Keith 
Nicholson purchased an addition $100,000 policy, allegedly as a result 
of Prudential's fraudulent sales practices. Carol Nicholson alleged 
churning, vanishing premium and investment plan claims. 
 
Martin Dorfner and his wife operate a small grocery store in 
Pennsylvania. By July 1989, they owned several Prudential policies. 
Dorfner alleges that his Prudential agent informed the Dorfners that they 
were entitled to a "free" policy, and proceeded to open another whole life 
policy for them using funds drawn from their existing policies. In 
addition, the same agent persuaded the Dorfners to purchase a $50,000 
variable appreciable life insurance policy from Prudential in April 1991, 
allegedly using misleading sales information. Dorfner brought suit in 
January 1995, alleging churning and vanishing premium claims. 
 
Vincent and Elizabeth Kuchas are Connecticut residents who 
purchased individual variable life policies from Prudential. In 1987, 
their 
agent suggested that they purchase additional policies. The Kuchases 
allege that they informed the agent that they were seeking an investment 
similar to an IRA, and could not afford an investment plan if they had 
to continue payment on their current Prudential policies. The agent 
allegedly persuaded the Kuchases to purchase two VAL policies while 
misinforming them as to their continuing payment obligations with 
respect to their initial policies. In September 1994, the Kuchases learned 
that the initial policies had lapsed and that their agent had taken out 
loans against the initial policies to pay for the VALs. They filed suit in 
February 1995. 
 
Norman Gassman, an Ohio citizen, filed suit against Prudential in May 
of 1995, alleging an investment plan claim. According to Gassman, a 
Prudential agent persuaded Gassman to take $20,000 from a certificate 
of deposit and "invest" it in a VAL policy. Gassman alleges that the agent 
held himself out as a "financial planner" or"financial consultant" and 
explained that a VAL policy was part of an "investment plan," paid a 
higher rate of interest than a CD at a low risk, and was tax free. In 
reliance on these representations, Gassman purchased the VAL policy. 
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discovered patterns of abuse involving financed insurance. 
Plaintiffs alleged that Prudential failed to take serious steps 
to combat the abuses, focusing instead on "damage control" 
and warning internal auditors not to "rock the boat." For 
example, when Prudential's auditing department tested a 
new computer system to detect churning in its Minneapolis 
office, sales dropped off sharply. Instead of addressing the 
concerns raised by the audit department, Prudential merely 
referred the matters to the "marketing" group, which took 
no steps to stop the fraudulent activities. Second Am. Cons. 
Compl. P 86. 
 
Three days after the filing of the Second Amended 
Consolidated Complaint, Prudential and class counsel 
entered into a settlement agreement. There were three 
preconditions to the agreement. First, those states which 
had adopted the Task Force Remediation Plan through the 
execution of the Consent Order had to agree to modify the 
Consent Order to conform to the Settlement Agreement. 
Second, the final Stipulation of Settlement had to be 
executed by October 28, 1996. Lastly, the parties reserved 
the right to modify the Stipulation of Settlement to reflect 
any new information revealed by class counsel's ongoing 
discovery.12 The Settlement Agreement did not address 
attorneys' fees.13 
 
On October 28, 1996, the parties filed a final Stipulation 
of Settlement. At that time, the district court issued an 
order conditionally certifying a national settlement class, 
directing issuance of class notice, issuing an injunction,14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. On October 25, 1996, Prudential formally responded to plaintiffs' 
discovery requests, producing over one million pages of documents, 160 
computer diskettes, and more than 500 audio and video tapes. See 
Weiss Aff. P 85. 
 
13. Although S K of the Settlement Agreement was entitled "Attorneys' 
Fees, Costs and Expenses," subsection K.1 was left blank. Subsection 
K.2 addressed certain additional expenses to be included in any payment 
of fees, and guaranteed that any payment of fees would not reduce the 
remedies provided under the agreement. Subsection K.3 also provided 
that Prudential's liability for fees would be limited only to those fees 
expressly provided for by the Settlement Agreement. 
 
14. The injunction barred policyholders from pursuing overlapping 
litigation unless the policyholder had opted out of the class, and 
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and scheduling a fairness hearing for January 21, 1997. 
The notice was sent to each of the more than 8 million 
class members by first class mail on or before November 4, 
1996, and gave them until December 19, 1996 to file 
objections or opt out of the class.15 
 
       1. The Proposed Settlement 
 
The proposed settlement was largely based on the Task 
Force Report and its proposed remediation plan. Like the 
Task Force plan, the settlement proposed a remediation 
scheme by which class members had the option of either 
pursuing their claims through an Alternate Dispute 
Resolution procedure or electing Basic Claim Relief. The 
proposed settlement class included all persons who owned 
one or more Prudential insurance policies between January 
1, 1982 and December 31, 1995, with certain exceptions.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
prevented them from excluding other policyholders from the class. After 
the class notice was mailed, several named plaintiffs in a competing 
nationwide class action, filed and certified in Alabama state court three 
days after the Settlement Agreement was signed (the"Steele action"), 
opted out of the class. The so-called "Steele Opt-outs" also attempted, as 
class representatives in the Steele action, to execute opt-outs on behalf 
of the entire class. At Prudential's request, the district court issued an 
Order to Show Cause on January 22, 1997. On May 28, 1997, the 
district court ruled that the opt-out of the Steele class was null and 
void 
as a violation of the permanent injunction. The Steele Opt-outs filed an 
appeal with this Court. We affirmed the district court in an unpublished 
opinion. 
 
15. In December 1996, Krell moved the district court to recuse itself. The 
district court denied the motion, and Krell's subsequent petition for 
mandamus relief was denied by this Court without opinion on April 4, 
1997. 
 
16. The following were explicitly excluded from the class: 1) 
policyholders 
who were represented by counsel and had already settled a claim and 
signed a release with Prudential; 2) policyholders that are corporations, 
banks, trusts or other non-natural entities that purchased policies as 
corporate or trust-owned life insurance and under which a) there are 
fifty or more separate insured individuals, or b) the aggregate premium 
paid over an eight year period, ending with the close of 1996, exceeds $1 
million; and 3) those policyholders who were issued policies in 1995 by 
Prudential Select Life Insurance Company of America. Stipulation of 
Settlement at 13. 
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The class included approximately eight million Prudential 
policyholders who own or owned approximately 10.7 million 
policies. 
 
a. The Alternative Dispute Resolution process 
 
Under the ADR process contained in the proposed 
settlement, class members who believed they had been 
misled could submit a claim to Prudential. The claim form 
provided to all potential class members contained both 
narrowly drawn questions designed to elicit information 
relating to specific evidentiary scoring criteria established 
under the settlement, as well as more open-ended 
questions allowing claimants to explain the exact nature of 
their claims. Claimants were also asked to submit any 
supporting documents in their possession. Prudential 
established a toll-free hotline to allow claimants to speak to 
a Claimant Support team, whose members are specially 
trained to answer policyholder inquiries, assist with filling 
out claim forms, and advise them with respect to the 
collection of supporting documents. Once the claim form 
was submitted, Prudential was obligated to locate all of its 
records pertaining to the claim and submit them for 
consideration. 
 
Once a claim has been filed and all the relevant materials 
gathered, the claim is subject to a four tier review process. 
At the first level, the claim would be examined by a member 
of the Claim Evaluation Staff, who will apply a set of 
specific criteria for each of four general categories of sales 
complaints: (1) financed insurance (taking a loan against an 
existing policy in order to pay the premiums on a new 
policy); (2) abbreviated payment plans (using dividends 
from a policy to pay the premiums on that policy); (3) life 
insurance sold as an investment; and (4) other improper 
sales practices.17 Based on the application of the 
established criteria, the reviewers then assign a score from 
zero to 3 to each claim.18 The Claim Evaluation Staff is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The financed insurance criteria include an assessment of Prudential's 
conformity with state replacement laws. 
 
18. The scoring system set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement is as 
follows: 
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comprised of specially trained Prudential employees who 
are not associated with Prudential's individual life 
insurance sales force. 
 
Any claim not receiving a score of "3" will automatically 
be reviewed by a team of independent claim evaluators who 
are selected by class counsel and representatives of the 
state regulators. This team will apply the same criteria as 
the Claim Evaluation Staff, and make a written 
recommendation if it believes the claimant's score should 
be adjusted. 
 
That recommendation is then examined by a member of 
the Claim Review Staff, which is comprised of Prudential 
employees who have not worked as or had supervisory 
authority over Prudential sales agents. The determination of 
the Claim Review Staff may not be appealed by Prudential. 
The claimant, however, may appeal the decision to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       - A score of "3" is assigned in the event that either (i) Company 
       Documentation expressly supports the Misstatement, or (ii) the 
       Agent Statement confirms the Claimant's allegation of the 
       Misstatement and this confirmation is not undermined by Available 
       Evidence. 
 
       - A score of "2" is assigned in the event that the alleged 
       Misstatement is not expressly in writing and the Agent Statement 
       denies the allegations, but (i) Available Evidence, on balance, 
       supports the Claimant's allegation of the Misstatement, or (ii) the 
       Agent has a Complaint History. 
 
       - A score of "1" is assigned in the event that the alleged 
       Misstatement is not expressly in writing and the Agent Statement 
       denies the allegation, and Available Evidence, on balance, neither 
       supports nor undermines the Claimant's allegation of the 
       Misstatement. 
 
       - A score of "0" is assigned in the event that Available Evidence 
       exists which undermines the Claimant's allegation of the 
       Misstatement and suggests that no Misstatement occurred. 
 
       - A score of "N/A" is assigned in the event that the Claim 
Resolution 
       Factor is "not applicable" to the Claim submitted. 
 
Prudential Alternative Dispute Resolution Guidelines, Stipulation of 
Settlement, Ex. B, at 9. 
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fourth level of review, the Appeals Committee. The Appeals 
Committee is selected by class counsel and representatives 
of the state regulators from a list agreed upon by class 
counsel, the state regulators, and Prudential. While the 
Appeals Committee must apply the same criteria, its review 
of the claim is de novo.19 
 
The relief afforded a claimant varies depending on the 
final score he or she is awarded. Those obtaining a score of 
zero are afforded no relief. Those with a score of"1" may 
obtain relief only through Basic Claim Relief. Those with 
scores of "2" or "3" are entitled to compensatory relief.20 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. During this phase of the review, claimants may receive cost-free 
representation from a representative selected by class counsel and 
approved by the state regulators. The claimant is entitled to a full 
rehearing if the representative determines that a "manifest injustice" has 
occurred. 
 
20. Under the Stipulation of Settlement, the following relief is available 
based on the category of claim proven: 
 
       Financed Insurance - The policyholder may obtain a refund of the 
       loans, dividends, or values improperly used, with interest in some 
       cases. The policyholder also may be entitled to cancel the "new" 
       policy and get back some or all of the premiums paid, with interest 
       in some cases. 
 
       Abbreviated Payment - The policyholder may be permitted to cancel 
       the policy `and obtain a refund of some or all of the premiums 
paid, 
       with interest in some cases. Alternatively, the policyholder may be 
       permitted to keep the policy without having to make any additional 
       out-of-pocket payments for some or all of the premiums due. 
 
       Investment Product - The policyholder may be allowed to cancel the 
       policy and obtain a refund of some or all of the premiums paid, 
with 
       interest in some cases. Alternatively, the policyholder may be able 
to 
       exchange the policy for an annuity. 
 
       Other Claims - If a policyholder was misled in some other way, the 
       policyholder may be allowed to cancel the policy and obtain a 
refund 
       of some or all of the premiums paid, with interest in some cases, 
or 
       may be able to use the refund to purchase another policy. 
 
Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 490 (citing February 1, 1997 Notice 
at 7-8). 
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b. Basic Claim Relief 
 
Basic Claim Relief allows the class member to obtain one 
or more forms of relief without having to demonstrate 
liability on Prudential's part. The available forms of Basic 
Claim Relief include: (1) low interest loans to help policy 
holders make premium payments on existing policies; (2) 
enhanced value policies which allow members to purchase 
new policies with additional coverage paid for by Prudential; 
(3) deferred annuities enhanced by contributions from 
Prudential; and (4) the opportunity to purchase shares in 
designated mutual funds enhanced by a contribution from 
Prudential. 
 
c. Enhancements To the Task Force Plan 
 
The district court found the settlement improved upon 
the Task Force's remediation plan in several ways. Fairness 
Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 492-95. First, the court found 
that the settlement improved the structure of the ADR 
process by including class counsel and their 
representatives in the monitoring process, and improving 
the claim scoring criteria21 and evidentiary factors used to 
analyze ADR claims.22 It also enhanced the remedies 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. The district court noted several improvements to the Settlement's 
ADR process that would enhance the ability of a policyholder to establish 
the presumption that he or she was misled. These enhancements to the 
ADR process were: 
 
       (1) Provided that boilerplate statements in policy illustrations 
and 
       contracts explaining that the dividends, interest or investment 
       returns are "not guaranteed" or "non-guaranteed," will not 
       independently undermine a claim; 
 
       (2) Reduced from six complaints to three the number of policyholder 
       complaints against an agent which would entitle a claimant to a 
       score of at least "2"; and 
 
       (3) Extended the period during which policyholder complaints would 
       be considered from July 9, 1996 to February 1, 1997. 
 
Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 492. 
 
22. The district court also noted the proposed settlement "include[d] 
significant improvements in the factors and evidentiary considerations 
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available through both the ADR process and Basic Claim 
Relief,23 and provided for a blanket waiver of statute of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
used to evaluate claims." Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 492. The 
court found that the settlement enhanced the Task Force ADR plan by: 
 
       (1) Allowing a claimant's score to be raised if documents 
originally 
       kept by Prudential that could affect the scoring have improperly 
       been destroyed and no copies can be located; 
 
       (2) Allowing the claimant's score for "churning" to be raised if 
12% 
       of the selling agent's total sales were "financed insurance" sales, 
as 
       opposed to a threshold figure of 15% under the Task Force plan; 
 
       (3) Allowing a claimant's score to be raised if blank, unsigned 
       disbursement forms were used without the policyholder's consent; 
 
       (4) Allowing a claimant's score to be raised for "vanishing 
premium" 
       claims if an agent used the phrases "vanishing premium" or 
       "vanishing point" in writing in connection with the sale of the 
policy 
       at issue; 
 
       (5) Removing as a negative consideration the fact that a policy 
       lapsed prior to the date when the premiums were to "vanish", if it 
       appears that the policyholder became aware, prior to the 
       misrepresented "vanish" date, that the policy would not perform as 
       illustrated; 
 
       (6) Requiring Prudential to contact agents regarding policies they 
       sold to obtain additional information about the sale of the policy, 
       and to encourage honest responses by agreeing not to take 
       disciplinary action against an agent based on his or her truthful 
       statements; 
 
       (7) Removing Prudential from its co-equal role with the regulators 
in 
       the selection of a representative to advocate on behalf of the 
       claimant at the arbitration level, and eliminating the $10 million 
cap 
       on the funding the representative could receive; and 
 
       (8) Creating an entirely new position, the "Claimant 
Representative," 
       selected by Class Counsel and responsible for overseeing the entire 
       process on behalf of the claimant, including the initial claim 
review. 
 Id. at 492-93. 
 
23. The enhancements to the ADR remedies were: 
 
       (1) The settlement provided 100% interest to claimants scoring a 
"2" 
       or a "3" in the ADR process (compared to the Task Force plan, 
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limitations and other defenses which Prudential might 
otherwise have. 
 
Second, it provided minimum financial guarantees which 
were not contained in the Task Force plan. In addition to 
the uncapped relief provided under both the Task Force 
plan and the proposed settlement, Prudential guaranteed to 
pay at least $260 million for each 110,000 claims remedied 
(up to 330,000), with a minimum payment of $410 million 
regardless of the number of claims remedied. Prudential 
also agreed to pay an additional remediation amount based 
on a sliding scale from $50 to $300 million, depending on 
the number of claims remedied. This amount was to be 
allocated by the district court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       which provided zero interest for scores of "2"), and allows 
rescission 
       of the policy and a refund of the premiums, with interest; 
 
       (2) The settlement allowed a claim receiving a either a "2" or a 
"3" 
       to receive relief where a policy lapsed before the claimant died, 
as 
       opposed to the requirement under the Task Force plan that a 
       claimant receive a "3." three. 
 
       (3) Full compensatory relief for a vanishing premium claim where a 
       Prudential agent promised the claimant would have a"paid up" 
       policy; 
 
       (4) Removal of the exclusion in the Task Force plan which prevented 
       claims on behalf of the decedent where the policyholder/decedent 
       died while the policy was in force. 
 
Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 493-94. 
 
The court found that the settlement enhanced the Basic Claim Relief 
by: 
 
       (1) Eliminating fifty basis points on Optional Premium Loans; 
 
       (2) Increasing Prudential's contributions to the annual premiums 
for 
       Enhanced Value Policies; 
 
       (3) Increasing Prudential's contributions toward the purchase price 
       of Enhanced Value Annuities; 
 
       (4) Creating a new form of Basic Claim relief known as Mutual Fund 
       Enhancements, for which Prudential would contribute 4% of the 
       initial purchase price to the fund, up to a maximum of $2,000. 
 Id. at 494. 
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Finally, the district court noted the "Proposed Settlement 
establishe[d] an unparalleled outreach program to ensure 
that class members are adequately informed." Fairness 
Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 492. This included mailing 
individual notice to over 8 million current and former 
policyholders, and publishing summary notices in the 
national editions of The New York Times, The Wall Street 
Journal, USA Today, and The Newark Star Ledger. The 
summary notice was also published in the largest 
newspaper in each of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia. In addition, the Stipulation of Settlement 
provided that, following final approval of the settlement, 
post-settlement notice would be (a) mailed to each class 
member, (b) published in the national editions of The New 
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, The 
Newark Star Ledger, and other regional newspapers, and (c) 
disseminated through television and radio advertising "on 
stations having representative regional coverage." 
Stipulation of Settlement at 27-29. Finally, the outreach 
program established a six-day-a-week toll-free "800" 
number, staffed by specially trained personnel, to answer 
class member questions.24 The Task Force plan did not 
describe how its outreach program would be implemented. 
Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 494. 
 
       2. The Fairness Hearing 
 
The district court held the fairness hearing on February 
24, 1997.25 At that time the court heard oral argument from 
all parties who requested the opportunity to speak, 
including objectors. The district court also permitted 
appearances by several states and allowed the California 
Insurance Commissioner and the Florida Insurance 
Commissioner to appear as amicus curiae. The court 
allowed the Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner, the 
Massachusetts Attorney General and the Texas Insurance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. At oral argument, Lead Counsel noted that approximately 1.8 million 
phone calls had already been processed. Tr. of Oral Argument, January 
26, 1998, at 125 (Testimony of Melvyn Weiss). 
 
25. The district court postponed the hearing date, originally set for 
January 21, 1997, in order to allow policyholders more time to respond 
to the class notice and to provide the parties more time to prepare. 
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Commissioner to intervene under Rule 24(b). The New 
Jersey Department of Insurance appeared informally as 
amicus curiae, on its own behalf and on behalf of the 
Multi-State Life Insurance Task Force. 
 961<!>Before the fairness hearing, Prudential reached 
 
agreements with the remaining state objectors - California, 
Florida, Texas and Massachusetts - whereby several 
enhancements were made to the Proposed Settlement. 
Among those were an automatic score of "3" where a 
claimant had a life insurance application containing an 
unauthorized signature, and consideration as one of the 
scoring criteria the fact that a claimant was over the age of 
sixty at the time of sale.26 These enhancements were 
subsequently incorporated into the settlement and made 
available to all claimants. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. 
at 473.27 The district court also took notice that these four 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. The district court noted five enhancements which resulted from the 
negotiations between the state regulators and Prudential. These were: 
 
       (1) The extension of the complaint history cut-off until February 
1, 
       1997; 
 
       (2) An increase in the interest paid on claims receiving a score of 
"2" 
       from 50% to 100%; 
 
       (3) The addition of an evidentiary criterion allowing the claim 
       evaluator to consider that a claimant was 60 years or older at the 
       time of the sale; 
 
       (4) The addition of a claim resolution factor awarding an automatic 
       score of "3" if a claimant's life insurance application contained 
an 
       unauthorized signature; and 
 
       (5) The requirement that Prudential provide claimants, at the 
       claimants request, with current account information, such as 
       outstanding loans, dividend payments and "currently illustrated 
       year of abbreviation." 
 
Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 498. 
 
27. Krell disputes this finding, and argues that the additional 
enhancements benefitted only the citizens of those four states. Krell 
Brief 
at 47 n.56. Krell's argument relies primarily on its assertion that 
Florida 
residents received better notice and were benefitted by more favorable 
evidentiary presumptions, including a more favorable definition of 
replacements. Id.; see also Krell Reply Brief at 49-51. Lead Counsel 
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states received, in addition to the negotiated enhancements, 
additional fines and penalties from Prudential which were 
paid to the states, and not to aggrieved policyholders. 
 
On March 7, 1997 the able district court issued a 
summary Memorandum Opinion and Order certifying the 
class and approving the settlement as fair and reasonable, 
and ten days later filed a lengthy (almost 250 pages) and 
thorough opinion explaining its decision. 
 
II. ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS 
       OF REVIEW 
 
Appellants principally challenge five distinct elements of 
the settlement. First, they raise the threshold issue whether 
the district court had jurisdiction over this class action. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
responds that the court was correct to rely on Prudential's statements in 
open court to the effect that the enhancements would be available to all 
class members. Lead Counsel Brief at 58. Additionally, Lead Counsel 
notes that the district court found the settlement was fair and 
reasonable even without the state-negotiated enhancements. Id. 
 
We disagree with Krell. At the Fairness Hearing on February 24, 1997, 
Krell raised his concern regarding the state-negotiated enhancements. 
Prudential explained that "the ADR plan changes that were agreed to 
with the four states in terms of modifications of scoring and relief will 
be 
made available nationally through the class settlement." Tr. of Fairness 
Hearing at 141. An examination of the settlements signed by the four 
objecting states and the Amendment to Stipulation of Settlement filed by 
the settling parties supports the district court'sfinding. Also, while 
Prudential's explanation does not specifically respond to Krell's 
assertion 
that Florida residents received enhanced notice, we do not believe this is 
significant. As discussed infra, we find the notice provided under the 
settlement was adequate, and it is not rendered inadequate by any 
additional notice provisions negotiated by an individual state. Finally, 
Krell's argument with respect to replacement claims misses the mark. As 
Prudential explained at the hearing, the "scoring enhancements [in the 
ADR process] where there was a violation of state regulations on 
replacement will be based on each states' individual replacement 
regulations where the policy was sold . . . [t]he Florida provision is 
confirmatory and expands what is already in the plan." Tr. of Fairness 
Hearing at 174. Thus, any provision negotiated by Florida regarding the 
definition of replacement is based on Florida law and is not applicable to 
other states. 
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Second, they challenge the court's certification of the 
settlement class. Third, they contest the district court's 
order approving the proposed settlement as fair and 
reasonable. Fourth, appellants take issue with the district 
court's $90 million award of attorneys' fees. Finally, they 
once more take aim at the district court's handling of this 
case, appealing the denial of their motion to disqualify 
under 28 U.S.C. SS 455(a), 455(b)(1) and 455(b)(5)(iv). 
 
"The decision of whether to approve a proposed 
settlement of a class action is left to the sound discretion 
of the district court." Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156 
(3d Cir. 1975). Consequently, we will reverse the district 
court "for a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 156 n.7. In 
addition, the certification of a class and the award of 
reasonable attorneys' fees are also subject to an abuse of 
discretion standard. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up 
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 782 (3d 
Cir. 1995) ("G.M. Trucks"). "An appellate court may find an 
abuse of discretion where the `district court's decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.' " Id. at 783 (quoting International Union, UAW v. Mack 
Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987)). Our review of 
jurisdictional issues, however, is plenary. Anthuis v. Colt 
Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
III. JURISDICTION 
 
The Krell and Johnson appellants contend the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over most of the 
class, including objectors. Additionally, they contend that 
there is no Article III "case or controversy" with respect to 
the class claims, and that the court's exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction was improper. 
 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
As an initial matter, the district court found it had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs in this 
class action. In particular, the court found it had both 
federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction over 
the class, as well as supplemental jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1367. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 500. 
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The district court found exclusive federal question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1331 based on the claims of 
named plaintiff Dorfner. Dorfner alleged violations of the 
federal securities laws, in particular Sections 10(b) and 
20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated thereunder. In addition, approximately 30% of 
the policies at issue were registered securities, and thus fell 
within the court's federal question jurisdiction. The district 
court also found it had diversity jurisdiction over each of 
the named plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. All named 
plaintiffs were residents of different states from the 
defendants named in the complaint. Additionally, the 
named plaintiffs have each alleged more than $50,000 in 
losses as a result of Prudential's fraudulent scheme, and 
thus meet the "amount-in-controversy" requirement in 
effect at the time the complaint was filed.28 
 
The primary jurisdictional objection raised on appeal 
relates to the district court's assertion of supplemental 
jurisdiction over the absentee class members on the basis 
of 28 U.S.C. S 1367. The court found that all of the class 
claims are "inextricably factually intertwined" because they 
are all "premised upon a common course of conduct by 
Prudential . . . relat[ing] to the same alleged company wide 
development and implementation of the patently fraudulent 
sales techniques." Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 501. 
Noting that S 1367 applies to both pendent parties and 
pendent claims, the district court concluded it had the 
discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
entire dispute and the proposed settlement on the basis of 
its initial federal question jurisdiction. The court also found 
it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state 
claims on the basis of its diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 505. 
 
Appellants dispute both of these asserted grounds for 
supplemental jurisdiction. They contend the federal claims 
of plaintiff Dorfner, the claims of persons with purely state 
law claims, and the panoply of "other" sales claims do not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. The 1996 Amendment to 28 U.S.C. S 1332, which raised the amount- 
in-controversy requirement from $50,000 to $75,000, did not take affect 
until after the filing of the Second Amended Consolidated Complaint. See 
Pub. L. No. 104-317, S 205(b) (1996). 
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derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, and thus 
the district court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
based on its jurisdiction over plaintiffs' federal securities 
claims.29 Johnson Brief at 4. Appellants also contest the 
district court's assertion of supplemental jurisdiction based 
on its initial diversity jurisdiction. They contend that, in 
order for the district court to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction, each putative class member must meet the 
amount-in-controversy requirement of S 1332. Johnson 
Brief at 7-8 (citing Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 
291 (1973)). Finally, appellants argue the district court's 
application of 28 U.S.C. S 1367 to assert jurisdiction over 
the proposed class violates Article III. 
 
The settling parties respond with two arguments. First, 
they claim the district court correctly exercised 
supplemental jurisdiction based on its original federal 
question jurisdiction because all class members' claims 
arise from the same case or controversy. Thus there is no 
need to address the question of the district court's diversity 
jurisdiction. In the alternative, they argue that appellants' 
reliance on Zahn is misplaced, and thatS 1367 overruled 
Zahn's requirement that all class members meet the 
amount-in-controversy requirement of S 1332. 
Consequently, the court could properly exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction based on its original diversity 
jurisdiction. 
 
       1. Federal Question Jurisdiction as a Basis fo r 
       Supplemental Jurisdiction 
 
None of the parties contest the district court's assertion 
of federal question jurisdiction "over [plaintiff] Dorfner's 
federal securities claims, and the federal securities claims 
of other similarly situated plaintiffs." Fairness Opinion, 962 
F. Supp. at 500. Instead they focus their arguments on the 
court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 
 
Before enactment of S 1367, a district court could only 
exercise jurisdiction over claims which did not satisfy the 
requirements of SS 1331 and 1332 by applying the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. They also argue that Dorfner could not be expected to bring both his 
federal claims and his purely state law claims in the same suit. 
 
                                28 
  
principles of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction. The concept 
of pendent jurisdiction, as explained by the Supreme Court 
in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), 
allowed a court to hear non-federal claims over which it did 
not have diversity jurisdiction provided those claims shared 
a "common nucleus of operative fact" with the claims that 
supported the court's original jurisdiction. But this 
extension of jurisdiction was permitted only when it would 
promote "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to 
litigants." 383 U.S. at 726. 
 
While pendent jurisdiction allowed district courts to hear 
additional, non-federal claims which were part of the same 
"case" as those claims within the court's original 
jurisdiction, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction allowed 
courts to hear claims brought against additional parties. 
Ancillary jurisdiction, however, was more limited than its 
counterpart. In Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 
U.S. 365 (1978), the Court held ancillary jurisdiction could 
not be asserted when to do so was contrary to the rule of 
complete diversity. Further, the Court found the doctrine of 
ancillary jurisdiction did not allow the addition of parties 
who were not within the court's original jurisdiction, even 
in cases in which the district court had exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
But the Finley Court noted the cases addressing the scope 
of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction were not entirely 
consistent, and offered the possibility that "[w]hatever we 
say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a 
particular statute can of course be changed by Congress." 
Id. at 556. 
 
Congress responded by passing the Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, which added S 1367 to the 
jurisdictional arsenal of the federal courts and essentially 
overruled Finley. Section 1367 combined the two concepts 
of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under the rubric of 
"supplemental" jurisdiction, providing for jurisdiction "in 
any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction" over "all other claims that are so related . . . 
that they form part of the same case or controversy under 
Article III." 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). The statute explicitly 
included "claims that involve the joinder or intervention of 
additional parties." Id. 
 
                                29 
  
The enactment of S 1367 has elicited a strong reaction 
from legal scholars. Some have argued that Congress 
intended S 1367 to be interpreted broadly, and hoped to 
encourage the federal courts to hear claims which might 
otherwise have fallen outside of their reach. See John B. 
Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal 
Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 
1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 735, 766 (Spring 
1991) ("By the juxtaposition of sections 1367(a) and 1367(c) 
Congress appears to have created a strong presumption in 
favor of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction."); 2 
Herbert B. Newberg and Alba Conte, Newberg on Class 
Actions, S 6.11, at 6-45 (3d ed. 1992) ("[T]here are multiple 
reasons to expect that the rulings of Zahn v. International 
Paper Co., requiring allegations that each class member 
satisfied jurisdictional amount requirements in diversity 
actions, have been legislatively bypassed."). Others have felt 
that S 1367 is constrained by prior Supreme Court 
decisions, and does not expand the courts' jurisdictional 
grant. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & 
Thomas M. Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion 
About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 
40 Emory L.J. 943, 960 n.90 (Fall 1991) (acknowledging 
that while a facial construction of S 1367 would appear to 
overrule Zahn, "the legislative history was an attempt to 
correct the oversight"); Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal 
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute - A Constitutional And 
Statutory Analysis, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 849, 973 (Fall 
1992)("[Section] 1367 should be interpreted as effecting no 
change in the prior practice and continuing undisturbed 
the rule of Zahn."). Regardless of Congress's intent with 
respect to Zahn, it is clear that S 1367 does not abrogate 
the rule of law established in Gibbs, and thus any exercise 
of supplemental jurisdiction must meet the requirements of 
Article III's "case or controversy" standard. See H.R. Rep. 
No. 101-734 at n.15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6860, 6875 n.15 (stating that S 1367(a) "codifies the scope 
of supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by the 
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs"); New 
Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, 
Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1505 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme 
Court delineated the modern constitutional bounds of 
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pendent [now referred to as supplemental] jurisdiction in 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs."); Oakley, 24 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. at 764 (noting that under S 1367, the district court's 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction "extends to the limits 
of Article III, thus ratifying and incorporating the 
constitutional analysis of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs"). 
 
There is no dispute the district court had jurisdiction 
over the federal securities claims alleged in the Second 
Amended Consolidated Complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v. 
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing Gully v. First 
National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-113 (1936)) ("The 
presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is 
governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which 
provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff 's properly 
pleaded complaint."). It is equally clear that, under S 1367, 
the district court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over any claims which were part of the same Article III 
"case or controversy" as the federal securities claims. 
Consequently, our analysis turns on whether the claims 
asserted in the Second Amended Consolidated Complaint 
meet the standard established in Gibbs. 
 
Under Gibbs, three requirements must be met for a court 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction: 
 
       The federal claims must have substance sufficient to 
       confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. The 
       state and federal claims must derive from a common 
       nucleus of operative fact. But if considered without 
       regard to their state or federal character, a plaintiff 's 
       claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to 
       try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming 
       substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in 
       the federal courts to hear the whole. 
 
383 U.S. at 725 (emphasis omitted) (footnote and internal 
citation omitted). 
 
A district court may not assert supplemental jurisdiction 
over state claims that are totally unrelated to the federal 
claims that form the basis of the court's jurisdiction. Lyon 
v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1995). In Lyon, the 
district court had original jurisdiction to hear claims under 
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the Fair Labor Standards Act, and elected to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state contract and tort 
claims. The federal claim involved the employer's failure to 
pay overtime wages, while the state claims related to a 
failure to pay certain bonuses. This Court ruled that the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction was inappropriate, 
because the only nexus between the state and federal 
claims was the employer/employee relationship, rather 
than the conduct underlying the claims.30  Id. at 764. 
 
The Second Amended Consolidated Complaint alleges 
that Prudential engaged in a widespread scheme to defraud 
customers. As part of that scheme, Prudential allegedly 
used "false and misleading sales presentations, policy 
illustrations, marketing materials, and other information 
approved, prepared and disseminated by Prudential to its 
nationwide sales force. Second Amended Consolidated 
Complaint at 3. According to plaintiffs, certain actions 
taken by Prudential in furtherance of that scheme violated 
S 10(b)31 and S 20(a)32 of the Securities and ExchangeAct. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. The Lyon court found that "under any standard, the nexus between 
the federal and state claims in this case is inadequate" to support 
supplemental jurisdiction. 45 F.3d at 762. The court went on to note: 
 
       Lyon's FLSA claim involved very narrow, well-defined factual issues 
       about hours worked during particular weeks. The facts relevant to 
       her state law contract and tort claims, which involved Whisman's 
       alleged underpayment of a bonus and its refusal to pay the bonus 
       if Lyon started looking for another job, were quite distinct. In 
these 
       circumstances it is clear that there is so little overlap between 
the 
       evidence relevant to the FLSA and state claims, that there is no 
       "common nucleus of operative fact" justifying supplemental 
       jurisdiction over the state law claims. In fact, it would be 
charitable 
       to characterize the relationship of the federal and state claims as 
       involving even a "loose" nexus. 
 
Id. at 763. 
 
31. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use 
       of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
       mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-- 
 
* * * 
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As noted, the district court agreed with the settling parties, 
finding that all of the class claims were "inextricably 
intertwined" because there was a common scheme to  
defraud.33 
 
We agree. The Second Amended Consolidated Complaint 
clearly alleges that Prudential engaged in a common 
scheme to defraud. Each category of claims raised in the 
Complaint relied on the implementation of that scheme, the 
training of Prudential's agents in conformity with it, and the 
use of pre-approved materials to support it. While only one 
category of claims alleged in the Complaint involved 
violations of the federal securities laws, all of the claims 
derive from the same common scheme, and thus from the 
same "nucleus of operative fact." That implementation of 
Prudential's scheme resulted in a variety of unlawful 
transactions does not negate the common basis they all 
shared. We recognize the need to scrutinize assertions of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction in these kinds of class 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any 
       security registered on a national securities exchange or any 
security 
       not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or 
       contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
       Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
       interest or for the protection of investors. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). 
 
32. Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides: 
 
       Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person 
liable 
       under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation 
       thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to 
the 
       same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such 
       controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in 
       good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or 
acts 
       constituting the violation or cause of action. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 78t(a). 
 
33. Furthermore, many plaintiffs had more than one claim stemming 
from the conduct of Prudential's sales agents. For example, named 
plaintiff Nicholson alleged churning, vanishing premium and investment 
plan claims, while named plaintiff Dorfner alleged churning and 
vanishing premium claims. See supra note 11. 
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actions where there are significant state law claims. But we 
believe the nexus between the federal and state claims is so 
close here that federal jurisdiction is appropriate. 
Consequently, we hold the district court properly exercised 
supplemental jurisdiction over the class members' state 
claims based on its federal question jurisdiction. 
 
Of course, S 1367 does not permit courts to take 
jurisdiction over tangentially related claims. The issue is 
whether there is a "common nucleus of operative fact" and 
whether the claims are part of the "same case or 
controversy under Article III." Here the facts underlying the 
investment deception are so intertwined with the other 
misrepresentations and frauds that, given the allegations of 
the overall scheme, they have the same factual predicate, 
making extension of federal jurisdiction appropriate. 
 
       2. Diversity Jurisdiction as a Basis for Supplemen tal 
       Jurisdiction 
 
The district court also found that it had supplemental 
jurisdiction under S 1367 based on its original diversity 
jurisdiction over named plaintiffs' claims underS 1332. As 
noted, the named plaintiffs satisfy the prerequisites for 
diversity jurisdiction. None of the named plaintiffs is a 
citizen of the same state as any defendant, satisfying the 
complete diversity requirement, and each of the named 
plaintiffs has alleged damages in excess of $50,000, 
satisfying the amount in-controversy requirement. The 
more perplexing question is whether the remaining class 
members must also satisfy the requirements of diversity 
jurisdiction in order for the court to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over their claims. 
 
Before enactment of S 1367, absentee class members 
seeking to establish the court's subject matter jurisdiction 
based on diversity of citizenship were not subject to the 
same requirements as the class representatives. According 
to the Supreme Court, the complete diversity requirement 
did not apply to absentee class members, but was satisfied 
so long as the named plaintiffs were completely diverse 
from defendants. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 
U.S. 356, 365-67 (1921). But the absentee class members 
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were each subject to the same amount-in-controversy 
requirement as the named plaintiffs, and could not 
aggregate their claims in order to satisfy S 1332. Zahn, 414 
U.S. at 301. 
 
Although the complete diversity rule of Supreme Tribe of 
Ben-Hur remains intact, the passage of S 1367 has raised 
serious questions about the continuing viability of Zahn. On 
the one hand, it is generally conceded that the plain 
language of S 1367 states a different amount-in-controversy 
rule from that set forth in Zahn.34 See, e.g., Russ v. State 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. Section 1367 provides: 
 
       (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly 
       provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which 
       the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts 
shall 
       have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 
       related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 
that 
       they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of 
       the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction 
shall 
       include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of 
additional 
       parties. 
 
       (b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original 
       jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the 
district 
       courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection 
(a) 
       over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 
       14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over 
       claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 
       of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiff under Rule 24 
of 
       such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such 
       claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements 
of 
       section 1332. 
 
       (c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
       jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-- 
 
       (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 
 
       (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims 
       over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 
 
       (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 
       original jurisdiction, or 
 
       (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling 
       reasons for declining jurisdiction. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1367. 
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Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 808, 817-20 (E.D. 
Pa. 1997). Section 1367(a) gives courts discretion to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction in all cases where the 
original claim supporting federal jurisdiction and the 
additional claim are part of the same Article III case or 
controversy, including those additional claims involving the 
joinder of parties. At the same time, S 1367(b) establishes 
certain exceptions to this permissive rule in cases where 
the court's original jurisdiction is based solely on diversity. 
In particular, S 1367(b) prohibits federal courts from 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over persons made 
parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, and 24, unless those 
additional claims independently satisfy S 1332. Under the 
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Congress's 
failure to include Rule 23 among the restrictions in 
subsection (b) would seem to indicate Congress did not 
intend to restrict the district court's exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction in class actions. In addition, 
Zahn's critics contend that, from a policy standpoint, the 
decision runs counter to Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur. They 
argue that while the complete diversity requirement 
upholds the very essence of diversity jurisdiction, the 
amount-in-controversy requirement is merely an 
administrative concept designed to limit the caseload of the 
federal judiciary. Consequently, they contend it would make 
little sense to create an exception to complete diversity in 
the context of class actions but to continue requiring all 
class members to meet the amount-in-controversy 
requirement. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J. 
dissenting) ("Particularly in view of the constitutional 
background on which the statutory diversity requirements 
are written, it is difficult to understand why the practical 
approach the Court took in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur must 
be abandoned where the purely statutory `matter in 
controversy' requirement is concerned.").35 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. It is interesting to note that one of the primary rationales for class 
actions is allowing access to the courts for parties whose individual 
claims are so small that it would be economically infeasible to pursue 
them individually. See 1 Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on 
Class Actions S 4.27 at 4-107 to 4-109 (3d ed. 1992). Consequently, 
upholding Zahn's amount-in-controversy requirement would largely 
undercut this purpose. 
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By contrast, others contend S 1367 was never intended to 
eliminate the amount-in-controversy requirement for 
 661<!>absentee class members established in Zahn. This 
 
argument relies heavily on the legislative history of the 
statute, in particular the House Judicial Committee Report 
that explicitly states S 1367 "is not intended to affect the 
jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 1332 in diversity- 
only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted 
prior to Finley." H.R. Rep. No. 101-734 at 29 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875 (footnote 
omitted). The footnote to this section of the Report 
specifically refers to Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur and Zahn, 
and supports the argument that the complete diversity and 
amount-in-jurisdiction rules of those cases survive the 
enactment of S 1367. Additionally, the Report of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee urges Congress to "expressly 
authorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the 
same `transaction or occurrence' as a claim within federal 
jurisdiction, including claims, within federal question 
jurisdiction, that require the joinder of additional parties, 
namely, defendants against whom that plaintiff has a 
closely related state claim." Report of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee 47 (1990) (quoted in Russ, 961 F. Supp. 
at 815). The limited scope of the Committee's suggestion 
can be read as support for upholding the restrictions of 
Zahn.36 
 
The cases addressing this issue reflect this difference of 
opinion. The only two appellate courts to examine this 
question have both found the language of the statute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. The Federal Courts Study Committee Working Papers showed that 
the matter had come to the attention of the Committee. 1 Federal Courts 
Study Committee Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports 561 n.33 
("From a policy standpoint, [Zahn] makes little sense, and we therefore 
recommend that Congress overrule it."). Nonetheless, the Committee did 
not adopt the proposal and, indeed, cautioned against reliance on the 
Working Papers. See Preface to Working Papers ("These [Working Papers] 
were valued background materials which the Committee determined 
should be published for general consideration whether or not the 
Committee agreed with their substantive proposals. . . . In no event 
should the [Working Papers] be construed as having been adopted by the 
Committee."). 
 
                                37 
  
controlling, and concluded that S 1367 overrules Zahn. See 
In re Abbott Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 
928, 930 (7th Cir. 1996). The Abbott Laboratories court 
reasoned that it could not "search legislative history for 
congressional intent unless [it found] the statute unclear or 
ambiguous," and that in the absence of such ambiguity 
"the statute is the sole repository of congressional intent." 
51 F.3d at 528-9 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, 
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-71 (1994); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., 
Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1991)). Because it 
found the plain language of the statute unambiguous, the 
court concluded that "under S 1367 a district court can 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class, 
although they did not meet the amount-in-controversy 
requirement, as did the class representatives." Id. at 529. 
 
Unlike the class action facing the court in Abbott 
Laboratories, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
addressed this question in the context of two plaintiffs 
seeking to join an additional claim that did not meet the 
amount-in-controversy requirement. Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 
930. The Stromberg court also reasoned that "[w]hen text 
and legislative history disagree, the text controls," and 
allowed the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in that 
instance. 77 F.3d at 931 (citing In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 
1340 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 
Most of the district courts that have addressed this issue 
have concluded otherwise. These courts have relied 
primarily on the legislative history to find that Zahn is still 
good law. See, e.g., Russ, 961 F. Supp. at 817-20; Crosby 
v. America Online, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 257, 263-64 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997); Griffin v. Dana Point Condominium Ass'n, 768 
F. Supp. 1299, 1301-02 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Judge Louis 
Pollak's opinion in Russ, while conceding that the plain 
language of the statute would appear to overrule Zahn, 
presents a persuasive analysis of the legislative history and 
the policy reasons supporting his conclusion that Zahn is 
unaffected by the enactment of the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute. 
 
The district court here followed the reasoning of Abbott 
Laboratories and concluded the plain language ofS 1367 
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overruled Zahn. Consequently, the district court found it 
also had supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal 
claims of absentee class members based on its diversity 
jurisdiction over the claims of the named plaintiffs. 
 
The question is by no means an easy one. From a policy 
standpoint, it can be argued that national (interstate) class 
actions are the paradigm for federal diversity jurisdiction 
because, in a constitutional sense, they implicate interstate 
commerce, foreclose discrimination by a local state, and 
tend to guard against any bias against interstate 
enterprises. Yet there are strong countervailing arguments 
that, at least under the current jurisdictional statutes, such 
class actions may be beyond the reach of the federal courts. 
 
Regardless of the relative strength of the competing 
arguments over Zahn's continued viability, we need not 
enter the fray. Because we have found that the district 
court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over 
class members' non-federal claims based on its original 
federal question jurisdiction, we need not decide whether 
the district court properly found it had supplemental 
jurisdiction based on its exercise of diversity jurisdiction 
over the claims of the named plaintiffs. The continued 
viability of Zahn and its effect on class actions will 
undoubtedly be addressed in the near future, either by the 
Supreme Court or by Congress, and at present we need not 
resolve the issue. 
 
B. Personal Jurisdiction 
 
The district court also found it had personal jurisdiction 
over all members of the proposed class. We agree. In the 
class action context, the district court obtains personal 
jurisdiction over the absentee class members by providing 
proper notice of the impending class action and providing 
the absentees with the opportunity to be heard or the 
opportunity to exclude themselves from the class. Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985). The 
combination of reasonable notice, the opportunity to be 
heard and the opportunity to withdraw from the class 
satisfy the due process requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment. Consequently, silence on the part of those 
receiving notice is construed as tacit consent to the court's 
 
                                39 
  
jurisdiction. Id.; see also Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 
10 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
The district court here directed that notice of the class 
action be sent to all persons who owned one or more 
Prudential insurance policies between 1982 and the 
present. Initially, we note the provision of individual notice 
to each class member is by no means typical of the notice 
provided in most class actions, and certainly qualifies as 
unprecedented. The notice provided here met the 
requirements for personal jurisdiction. It explained that 
each individual receiving notice was a member of the 
proposed class, and clearly set forth the procedure for 
opting out of the class. The notice also contained the 
proposed release, which explained that all claims would be 
waived if the individual did not elect to opt out of the class. 
Consequently, we find the members of the proposed class 
were adequately informed of their potential claims against 
Prudential, and the district court had personal jurisdiction 
over those members of the putative class who did not timely 
opt out.37 
 
C. Article III 
 
Appellants also dispute the district court's finding that 
this case qualified as a "case or controversy" under Article 
III. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 505-6. Appellants 
contend that, "whether analyzed under the feigned case 
doctrine or as a failure of Article III standing," the inclusion 
of both injured and uninjured policyholders in the certified 
class violates the case or controversy requirement of Article 
III because the parties have not suffered an "injury in fact." 
Public Citizen Brief at 16. Appellants also contend the 
inclusion and release of claims arising out of not only the 
three primary activities complained of, but also based on 
"other improper sales practices," disqualifies the action as 
a case or controversy under Article III. Id. at 16-17. Amicus 
curiae Public Citizen further argues that the record is 
devoid of information concerning these other improper sales 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
37. Appellants have questioned whether the notice adequately described 
the category of "other improper sales practices" claims so as to inform 
members that they might have a valid, compensable claim against 
Prudential. We believe it did. See discussion infra S V.C.2. 
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practices, that no plaintiff has claimed an injury as a result 
of them, and that there was never an intent to litigate 
them. Consequently, "there never has been any live 
controversy between Prudential and the `other improper 
sales practices' class." Id. at 17. The district court 
addressed appellants' contentions and found them to be 
without merit. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 506. 
 
We agree with the district court. Article III requires that 
federal courts may only adjudicate an actual "case or 
controversy." As the district court noted, whether an action 
presents a "case or controversy" under Article III is 
determined vis-a-vis the named parties. Id. at 506 (citing 
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974)). "Once threshold 
individual standing by the class representative is met, a 
proper party to raise a particular issue is before the court, 
and there remains no further separate class standing 
requirement in the constitutional sense."1 Newberg on 
Class Actions S 2.05 at 2-29 (3d Ed. 1992). The record in 
this case is replete with examples of the adversarial nature 
of these proceedings, and it is clear that all of the named 
representatives have a valid "case or controversy" with 
respect to Prudential's alleged fraudulent sales scheme. 
There is also ample evidence that each named party has 
suffered an "injury in fact" as a result of Prudential's sales 
practices and therefore has standing to bring suit. Thus, 
the named plaintiffs satisfy Article III. The absentee class 
members are not required to make a similar showing, 
because once the named parties have demonstrated they 
are properly before the court, "the issue [becomes] one of 
compliance with the provisions of Rule 23, not one of 
Article III standing." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 
113, 122 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 482 U.S. 656 (1987). 
 
We also note that, with respect to appellants' "feigned 
case" argument, the notice and the ADR process here were 
designed to determine which members of the class could 
demonstrate a compensable injury as a result of 
Prudential's allegedly deceptive practices. To require the 
named plaintiffs to determine beforehand which of the 8 
million policyholders were deceived and provide notice to 
only those persons would eliminate the viability of the class 
action device. 
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We also disagree that the parties never intended to 
litigate the "other sales practices" claims. As discussed, 
those claims, along with the three categories of specific 
violations, were all intertwined as part of the common 
scheme allegedly employed by Prudential. If the parties 
litigated the churning, vanishing premium and investment 
plan claims, they would have litigated their "other sales 
practice" claims as well. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the district court's 
exercise of jurisdiction. 
 
IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 
A. Settlement-Only Class Certification 
 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district 
court generally makes a determination whether to certify a 
class "as soon as practicable after the commencement of an 
action brought as a class action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). 
This certification may be conditional, and may be modified 
as needed. Id. Although the initial complaint in this case 
was filed on October 24, 1995, the district court delayed 
consideration of the certification issue pending the outcome 
of the Task Force investigation.38 
 
On October 28, 1996, the district court conditionally 
certified the proposed class for settlement purposes only. 
Reviewing the class action device historically, the Supreme 
Court noted that "[a]mong current applications of Rule 
23(b)(3), the `settlement only' class has become a stock 
device. . . . all Federal Circuits recognize the utility of Rule 
23(b)(3) settlement classes." Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 
___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997) (citations 
omitted); see also G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 786-800 
(examining the arguments for and against the use of 
settlement classes). But drawing on Judge Edward Becker's 
comprehensive opinion in Georgine v. Amchem Products, 
Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996),39  the Amchem Court noted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
38. As noted above, the district court partially granted Prudential's 
motion to dismiss on May 10, 1996. 
 
39. The proposed settlement in Georgine was the by-product of ongoing 
negotiation and litigation involving a group of asbestos manufacturers 
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the special problems encountered with settlement classes. 
Although as a general matter it approved the certification of 
classes for settlement purposes only, the Supreme Court 
cautioned that the certification inquiry is still governed by 
Rule 23(a) and (b), and that "[f]ederal courts . . . lack 
authority to substitute for Rule 23's certification criteria a 
standard never adopted - that if a settlement is`fair,' then 
certification is proper." Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248-49. 
 
Consequently, a district court must first find a class 
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23, regardless whether it 
certifies the class for trial or for settlement. Amchem, 117 
S. Ct. at 2248 ("The safeguards provided by the Rule 23(a) 
and (b) class-qualifying criteria, we emphasize, are not 
impractical impediments - shorn of utility - in the 
settlement class context."); G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 799-800 
("In sum, `a class is a class is a class,' and a settlement 
class, if it is to qualify under Rule 23, must meet all of its 
requirements."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and a myriad of plaintiffs whose cases had been consolidated in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel. 
Counsel for both sides negotiated separate settlements to resolve both 
the then-pending claims against the CCR and the inventory of unfiled 
claims held by plaintiffs' counsel. Once the extant cases were settled, 
the 
parties filed the Georgine class action on behalf of approximately 2 
million individuals who had not previously filed lawsuits against the 
asbestos defendants, but who had been exposed to asbestos products 
produced by defendants. While some members of the class had suffered 
physical injuries as a result of their exposure, other members of the 
class were "exposure-only" plaintiffs who had not yet developed any 
asbestos-related illness. The parties simultaneouslyfiled a complaint, an 
answer, a proposed settlement and a joint motion for conditional class 
certification. The district court granted the motion, and subsequently 
approved the settlement. On appeal, the Georgine court vacated the 
district court's opinion and remanded for decertification of the class, 
finding that the class did not satisfy the typicality, adequacy of 
representation, predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23. 
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 618. The Supreme Court affirmed. Amchem, 117 S. 
Ct. at 2244. 
 
Throughout this opinion, we will distinguish between the opinions of 
this Court and the Supreme Court by referring to the Supreme Court's 
decision as Amchem, and referring to this Court's opinion as Georgine. 
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The district court may take the proposed settlement into 
consideration when examining the question of certification. 
Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.40 In Amchem, the Supreme 
Court held "a district court [determining whether to certify 
a class for settlement purposes only] need not inquire 
whether the case, if tried, would present intractable 
management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be 
no trial." Id. at 2248. But at the same time the Court noted 
that "other specifications of the rule - those designed to 
protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad 
class definitions - demand undiluted, even heightened, 
attention in the settlement context." Id. In particular, the 
Court emphasized the importance of applying the class 
certification requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b) separately 
from its fairness determination under Rule 23(e). The Court 
noted that "[i]f a common interest in a fair compromise 
could satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3), that vital prescription would be stripped of any 
meaning in the settlement context." Id. at 2249-50.41 At the 
same time, the Court stressed the requirements found 
under Rule 23(a), in particular the stricture that"the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class." Indeed, the key to Amchem appears 
to be the careful inquiry into adequacy of representation. 
Id. at 2248 ("Subdivisions (a) and (b) [of Rule 23] focus 
court attention on whether a proposed class has sufficient 
unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by 
decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern 
persists when settlement, rather than trial, is proposed.") 
 
With this standard in mind, we will review the district 
court's analysis of the Rule 23 certification criteria. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
40. The district court did not have the benefit of the Amchem decision 
when it rendered its opinion, and did not take settlement into 
consideration when conducting its certification analysis. 
 
41. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, questioned the consistency of 
the majority approach. "If the majority means that these pre-settlement 
questions are what matters, then how does it reconcile its statement 
with its basic conclusion that `settlement is relevant' to class 
certification." Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2254. 
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B. Class Certification under Rule 23 
 
"Rule 23 is designed to assure that courts will identify 
the common interests of class members and evaluate the 
named plaintiff 's and counsel's ability to fairly and 
adequately protect class interests." G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 
799. In order to be certified, a class must satisfy the four 
requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) 
commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of 
representation.42 If the Rule 23(a) criteria are satisfied, the 
court must also find that the class fits within one of the 
three categories of class actions defined in Rule 23(b).43 In 
this instance the parties sought to certify the class under 
Rule 23(b)(3).44 In order to pass muster under Rule 23(b)(3), 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
42. Rule 23(a) provides: 
 
       One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
       representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so 
       numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there 
are 
       questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or 
       defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
       defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will 
fairly 
       and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
 
43. Rule 23(b)(1) authorizes certification in cases where separate actions 
by or against individual class members would risk establishing 
"incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class," 
Rule 23(b)(1)(A), or would "as a practical matter be dispositive of the 
interests" of nonparty class members "or substantially impair or impede 
their ability to protect their interests," Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Rule 23(b)(2) 
authorizes class actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, for 
example civil rights cases alleging class based discrimination. 
 
44. Rule 23(b)(3) provides: 
 
       (b) An action may be maintained as a class action if the 
       prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
 
* * * 
 
       (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the 
       members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
       only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
       other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of 
       the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) 
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the district court must determine that common questions of 
law or fact predominate and that the class action 
mechanism is the superior method for adjudicating the 
case. The requirements of subsections (a) and (b) are 
designed to insure that a proposed class has "sufficient 
unity so that absent class members can fairly be bound by 
decisions of class representatives." Amchem , 117 S. Ct. at 
2248; see also Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 177 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (" `[C]ommonality' like`numerosity' evaluates the 
sufficiency of the class itself, and `typicality' like `adequacy 
of representation' evaluates the sufficiency of the named 
plaintiff . . . ."). As noted, these class certification 
requirements are to be determined independently from the 
court's determination of the "fairness" of the proposed 
settlement under Rule 23(e).45 Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248 
(Rule 23(e) "was designed to function as an additional 
requirement, not a superseding direction, for the`class 
action' to which Rule 23(e) refers is one qualified for 
certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)."). 
 
       1. The Rule 23(a) Criteria 
 
        a. Numerosity 
 
The court must find that the class is "so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the interest of members of the class in individually controlling 
the 
       prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and 
       nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
       commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the 
       desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of 
the 
       claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be 
       encountered in the management of a class action. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
 
45. Rule 23(e) provides: 
 
       A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the 
       approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or 
       compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such a 
       manner as the court directs. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) 
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23(a)(1). No one has challenged the district court'sfinding 
that the proposed class satisfies the numerosity 
requirement. Indeed, the proposed class consists of more 
than 8 million present and former policyholders. 
 
        b. Commonality 
 
The commonality prong of Rule 23(a) asks whether"there 
are questions of law or fact common to the class." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(a)(2).46 The district court found the proposed 
class easily satisfied the commonality requirement, citing 
several common factual and legal issues which the class 
members would need to establish in order to prove 
Prudential's liability.47 Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
46. Courts frequently examine the Rule 23(a) requirement of 
commonality in conjunction with Rule 23(b)(3)'s"predominance" 
standard, reasoning that the "predominance requirement incorporates 
the commonality requirement." Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626; 1 Newberg on 
Class Actions S 3.13, at 3-71. Although the district court followed this 
approach and examined the predominance and commonality 
requirements together, appellants have not questioned the court's 
finding that the proposed class satisfies this element of Rule 23(a). 
 
47. The district court found that plaintiffs would need to establish the 
following common factual issues at trial: 
 
       - Prudential's common course of conduct; 
 
       - Prudential's development of  the sales presentations and 
materials, 
       and artificial inflation and maintenance of dividend scales; 
 
       - the sale of replacement and  vanishing premium policies by 
       material omission; 
 
       - the misrepresentation of po licies as investment or retirement 
       plans; 
 
       - the failure to train or sup ervise agents; 
 
       - Prudential's unwillingness to prevent deceptive sales practices; 
         and 
 
       - Prudential's scienter. 
 
Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 512. 
 
The district court also found that plaintiffs would need to establish the 
following common legal issues at trial: 
 
                                47 
  
512. The district court also noted that the MDL Transfer 
Order recognized that the transferred actions "involve 
common questions of fact . . . involv[ing] allegations that 
deceptive life insurance sales practices occurred or were 
encouraged as a [sic] result of some larger scheme or 
schemes organized by Prudential." Id. (quoting August 3, 
1995 Transfer Order at 1-2). Finally, the court found 
Prudential had asserted affirmative defenses which were 
common to all class members, and independently would 
satisfy the predominance requirement. Id. at 512-13.48 
 
We believe the court's finding that the proposed class 
satisfied the commonality requirement was within its sound 
discretion. A finding of commonality does not require that 
all class members share identical claims, and indeed 
"factual differences among the claims of the putative class 
members do not defeat certification." Baby Neal v. Casey, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       - whether policyholder relian ce could be presumed; 
 
       - whether Prudential's offer to finance a policyholder's purchase 
of 
       a policy constitutes an enforceable financing contract distinct 
from 
       the policy itself; 
 
       - whether Prudential breached the financing contract; 
 
       - whether Prudential breached  an obligation of good faith and fair 
       dealing; 
 
       - whether constructive trust principles apply to premiums received 
       as a (result of deceptive sales practices; 
 
       - whether compensatory claims  can be effectively quantified on a 
       class wide basis; and 
 
       - whether punitive damages sh ould be imposed. 
 
Id. 
 
48. The court also cited the following as examples of issues common to 
all class members: Prudential's fraudulent concealment of its 
misrepresentations; the use of substantially similar, and sometimes 
identical, oral and written misrepresentations by Prudential agents in 
furtherance of its fraudulent scheme; the required use of pre-approved 
written marketing materials; and the fact that Prudential trained its 
agents to use these fraudulent sales techniques. Fairness Opinion, 962 
F. Supp. at 513-16. 
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43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 
766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985)).49"The commonality 
requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at 
least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the 
prospective class." Id. As the district court found, the 
allegations in the Second Amended Consolidated Complaint 
raise numerous issues which all members of the class 
would need to demonstrate in order to succeed at trial. 
Consequently, the proposed class satisfies Rule 23(a)(2). 
 
        c. Typicality 
 
The district court found the claims of the class 
representatives were typical of the class as a whole. First, 
the court noted all of the named plaintiffs have alleged 
either churning, vanishing premium, or investment plan 
claims, or some combination of the three. Second, it relied 
on the "prominent guiding thread through all plaintiffs' 
claims - Prudential's scheme to defraud" to support its 
conclusion that the claims of the named plaintiffs are 
typical of the class as a whole. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. 
Supp. at 518. The court rejected the argument that"the 
class fails for lack of typicality because no class 
representative claims to have been injured by `other 
improper sales practices.' " Id. The court reasoned that the 
"class members injured by `other fraudulent sales practices' 
have suffered the same injury - they are victims of 
Prudential's deception - and have suffered the same generic 
type of harm - they have economic damages - as the named 
plaintiffs," thereby satisfying the typicality requirement. Id. 
at 519 (citing General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 
U.S. 147, 159 (1982)). 
 
On appeal, Krell reasserts his argument that the 
inclusion of the "other claims" defeats afinding of 
typicality. In particular, Krell contends the named plaintiffs' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
49. Krell objects to the district court's reference to Baby Neal, 
complaining that the court was inappropriately applying the Rule 
23(b)(2) standard for injunctive relief in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. 
The 
objection is clearly without merit. The district court applied Baby Neal 
in 
the context of its Rule 23(a) "commonality" analysis, a factor applicable 
whether the class action is brought under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). 
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claims cannot be representative of the class because the 
"other claims" are not identified. Krell Brief at 29; see also 
Public Citizen Brief at 13-16. Additionally, Krell contends 
the court failed to consider the variations among the laws 
of the 50 states, making its typicality analysis inadequate.50 
Amicus Public Citizen, relying on Falcon, argues plaintiffs 
must "show that the plaintiff class ha[s] been injured in the 
same manner as ha[ve] the named representative[s]." Public 
Citizen Brief at 15 (emphasis omitted). 
 
"The concepts of commonality and typicality are broadly 
defined and tend to merge." Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56 
(citing 7A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 1764, at 247 (1986)). The typicality requirement 
is designed to align the interests of the class and the class 
representatives so that the latter will work to benefit the 
entire class through the pursuit of their own goals. Id. at 
57 ("The typicality inquiry is intended to assess whether the 
action can be efficiently maintained as a class and whether 
the named plaintiffs have incentives that align with those of 
absent class members so as to assure that the absentees' 
interests will be fairly represented."); 1 Newberg on Class 
Actions, S 3.13. In this respect the commonality and 
typicality requirements both seek to ensure that the 
interests of the absentees will be adequately represented. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13. However, "neither of these 
requirements mandates that all putative class members 
share identical claims." Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56; Hassine 
v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d at 176-77; Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 
F.2d 786, 809 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 
(1985). In addition, "factual differences among the claims of 
the putative class members do not defeat certification." 
Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56. 
 
We believe the district court's typicality analysis is 
correct. The named plaintiffs, as well as the members of the 
proposed class, all have claims arising from the fraudulent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
50. Krell also argues the court improperly evaluated the typicality 
requirement because it merely presumed the factual and legal elements 
of named plaintiffs' claims were aligned with the claims of absentee class 
members. Krell's claim that the district court presumed typicality simply 
ignores the findings contained in the district court's opinion. 
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scheme perpetrated by Prudential. That overarching 
scheme is the linchpin of the Second Amended 
Consolidated Complaint, regardless whether each class 
member alleges a churning claim, a vanishing premium 
claim, an investment plan claim, or some other injury 
falling within the category of "other sales" claims. 
"Commentators have noted that cases challenging the same 
unlawful conduct which affects both the named plaintiffs 
and the putative class usually satisfy the typicality 
requirement irrespective of the varying fact patterns 
underlying the individual claims." Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 
58. Consequently, the factual distinctions among and 
between the named plaintiffs and the 8 million putative 
class members do not defeat a finding of typicality. "[E]ven 
relatively pronounced factual differences will generally not 
preclude a finding of typicality where there is a strong 
similarity of legal theories" or where the claim arises from 
the same practice or course of conduct. Id. 
 
This conclusion is further buttressed by the Supreme 
Court's holding in Falcon. The Supreme Court reversed 
certification of a class of Mexican-Americans who were 
challenging their employers hiring and promotion decisions 
on typicality grounds.51 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-59. Krell 
relies on Falcon for the proposition that"across-the-board" 
classes do not satisfy Rule 23. Krell Brief at 27-28. We 
disagree. Falcon did not strike down "across-the-board" 
classes per se, and, in fact, it agreed"with the proposition 
underlying the across-the-board rule - that racial 
discrimination is by definition class discrimination." Falcon, 
457 U.S. at 157. The Court nonetheless reversed the class 
certification because the district court had improperly 
presumed that Falcon's claims were typical of the class 
claims. In particular, the Court emphasized that Falcon's 
claim was based on the theory of disparate treatment, while 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
51. Falcon involved a Mexican-American employee who was denied a 
promotion, allegedly based on his national origin. After obtaining a 
right- 
to-sue letter from the EEOC, Falcon commenced a class action under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging discrimination against 
Mexican-Americans with respect to promotion. The class, however, was 
comprised of all Mexican-American employees and Mexican-Americans 
who had been denied employment. 
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the class claims relied on the theory of disparate impact. 
Consequently, Falcon would need to "prove much more 
than the validity of his own claim" in order to prove the 
claims of the absentee class members, and thus his claims 
were not typical of the class. Id. at 158. 
 
The present case is readily distinguishable. Unlike the 
plaintiff in Falcon, the named plaintiffs here have not relied 
on allegations that they were singled out and defrauded by 
Prudential. They have instead alleged that they suffered 
harm as the result of the same company-wide conduct that 
injured the absentee class members. The various forms 
which their injuries may take do not negate a finding of 
typicality, provided the cause of those injuries is some 
common wrong. Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58 (citing Falcon, 
457 U.S. at 157-59) ("Where an action challenges a policy 
or practice, the named plaintiffs suffering one specific 
injury from the practice can represent a class suffering 
other injuries, so long as all the injuries are shown to result 
from the practice."). In this instance, the alleged common 
scheme provides an appropriate basis for a finding of 
typicality. Since all members of the class would need to 
demonstrate the existence of this scheme, their interests 
are sufficiently aligned that the class representatives can be 
expected to adequately pursue the interests of the absentee 
class members. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248 (Rule 23 asks 
"whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that 
absent class members can fairly be bound by decisions of 
class representatives"). 
 
        d. Adequacy of Representation 
 
The final Rule 23(a) prerequisite encompasses two 
distinct inquiries designed to protect the interests of 
absentee class members. First, the adequacy of 
representation inquiry "tests the qualifications of the 
counsel to represent the class." G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 
800. Second, it "serves to uncover conflicts of interest 
between named parties and the class they seek to 
represent." Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250. The district court 
found that both class counsel and the named plaintiffs 
satisfied these tests. 
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With respect to class counsel, the court found that 
plaintiffs' counsel were highly competent and experienced 
class action attorneys, and had pursued the interests of the 
class vigorously. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 519-20. 
With respect to the class representatives, the court found 
named plaintiffs' interest in proving Prudential's"knowledge 
and orchestration of the scheme to defraud" and their 
"interest in obtaining relief commensurate with individual 
injury," as well as punitive damages, demonstrates that 
"there are no disparate interests to impair plaintiffs' 
incentive to prosecute fully all aspects of their claims 
against Prudential." Id. at 521. 
 
Krell contests the district court's analysis on several 
grounds. First, Krell disputes the district court'sfinding 
that class counsel adequately served the interests of the 
class. In particular, Krell argues that class counsel failed to 
take adequate discovery, and that an improper "clear 
sailing" fee agreement between class counsel and 
Prudential created an impermissible conflict of interest.52 
Krell Brief at 19-21, 51-53. 
 
Second, Krell contends the inclusion of the category of 
"other claims" defeats a finding of adequate representation. 
Krell argues because policyholders have an equity interest 
in any "surplus" of Prudential, the expansion of the class to 
include policyholders with unidentified "other claims," 
whose interests were "adverse to those with asserted 
claims," created a detriment on behalf of the"other" 
policyholders for the benefit of those with asserted claims. 
According to Krell, this conflict destroys the adequacy of 
named plaintiffs' representation. 
 
Third, Krell repeats his argument that the court's failure 
to consider the variations among the laws of the 50 states 
demonstrates that there was no adequate protection of the 
claims of absentees. In particular, Krell claims there was a 
conflict between class members with replacement claims 
and those without, so that the district court should have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
52. The court specifically noted that the fee agreement negotiated with 
Prudential subsequent to the negotiation of the Proposed Settlement did 
not undermine the adequacy of class counsel's representation. Fairness 
Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 519; see also infra S VI.C.1. 
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created a subclass of replacement claimants.53 Finally, both 
Krell and Public Citizen argue the proposed class 
improperly includes a subset of "futures" claimants, 
thereby running afoul of Amchem. 
 
We believe the district court exercised its sound 
discretion when it found class counsel and the named 
plaintiffs adequately represent the class. First, we believe 
class counsel vigorously pursued this class action. Both the 
uncapped nature of the proposed settlement and the 
"unprecedented" outreach program indicate that class 
counsel and the named plaintiffs have attempted to serve 
the best interests of the class as a whole. Further, we agree 
with the district court's finding that the attorneys' fee 
arrangement between class counsel and Prudential did not 
affect the adequacy of representation. See infra S VI.C.1. 
 
Second, we also agree with the district court that the 
named plaintiffs adequately represent the interests of the 
absentee class members. As discussed, the crux of this 
class action is the allegation that Prudential engaged in a 
scheme to defraud policyholders by means of company-wide 
deceptive sales practices. The named parties, like the 
members of the class, would need to establish this scheme 
in order to succeed on any of the claims in the Second 
Amended Consolidated Complaint. Even those class 
members with "other" claims share the common task of 
demonstrating the existence and implementation of this 
scheme. Consequently, we believe the proposed class 
satisfies the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 
23(a). 
 
We also reject the argument that the class as constituted 
included persons who are currently unaware of their injury, 
and that this "futures" class is barred under Amchem. 
Amchem, of course, found the proposed class did not meet 
the adequacy of representation standard because the 
interests of those with present injuries differed from those 
with "futures" claims. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2251 (finding 
that the economic interest of the currently injured 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
53. The district court explicitly rejected this argument. Fairness 
Opinion, 
962 F. Supp. at 522. For a more detailed discussion of Krell's 
replacement claims, see infra S V.A.4. 
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claimants "tugs against the interest of the exposure-only 
plaintiffs"). But Amchem is easily distinguished on its facts. 
Unlike the "exposure-only" plaintiffs in Amchem, the class 
members here need not wait to determine if they have been 
harmed by Prudential's fraudulent sales practices. There is 
no "future" manifestation of injury, because any injury 
suffered by a member of the class has already occurred. 
Having received notice of the pending class action and the 
availability of relief, members of the class can determine 
whether they have been victims of Prudential's fraud, either 
through a review of their records or by calling the toll-free 
number established by the settling parties. Consequently, 
the district court exercised its sound discretion infinding 
the proposed class meets the adequacy of representation 
requirement of Rule 23(a)(4). 
 
       2. The Rule 23(b) Criteria 
 
In order to certify an opt-out class under Rule 23(b)(3) 
the district court must make two additional findings: 
predominance and superiority. Issues common to the class 
must predominate over individual issues, and the class 
action device must be superior to other means of handling 
the litigation. The district court found both requirements 
were satisfied. 
 
        a. Predominance 
 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Amchem  
addressed the application of the predominance prong to 
"settlement only" classes. Although the Court made clear 
that consideration of the proposed settlement was proper 
when making a decision on class certification, it also placed 
limits on the weight to be accorded to the settlement. In 
particular, Amchem rejected the idea that the potential 
benefits of settlement are relevant to the predominance 
inquiry. According to the Court, the predominance "inquiry 
trains on the legal or factual questions that qualify each 
member's case as a genuine controversy, questions that 
preexist any settlement." Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2249. The 
court noted the "claims and defenses" relevant to both the 
predominance test and the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy of 
representation inquiry "refer to the kinds of claims or 
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defenses that can be raised in courts of law as part of an 
actual or impending law suit." 117 S. Ct. at 2249 n.18 
(quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76-77 (1986) 
(O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment)). 
 
In its predominance determination, the court focused 
primarily on plaintiffs' allegation that Prudential engaged in 
a common course of conduct by which it defrauded class 
members, and concluded that "[w]here many purchasers 
have been defrauded over time by similar 
misrepresentations, or by a common scheme to which 
alleged non-disclosures related, courts have found that the 
purchasers have a common interest in determining whether 
the defendant's course of conduct is actionable." Fairness 
Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 511 (citations omitted). 
 
The district court also rejected the argument that 
claimants' need to demonstrate reliance destroyed 
predominance, reasoning that "reliance is an issue 
secondary to establishing the fact of defendant's liability." 
Id. at 516 (citing 1 Newberg S 4.26 at 4-104) ("Challenges 
based on . . . reliance have usually been rejected and will 
not bar predominance satisfaction because [reliance 
pertains] to the right of a class member to recover in 
contrast to underlying common issues of the defendant's 
liability."). Additionally, the court noted that"most of the 
plaintiffs' claims do not even involve a reliance element," 
including their claims for breach of contract, breach of 
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, 
negligent training and supervision, and unjust enrichment. 
Id. Finally, the court found that, because "plaintiffs' fraud- 
based claims stem largely from misleading omissions," 
reliance can be presumed. Id. 
 
The district court also distinguished this case from 
Georgine. First, the court reasoned that "Prudential's 
alleged intentional use of the fraudulent sales tactics 
provides the `single central issue' lacking" in Georgine. Id. 
at 511 n.45. Whereas Georgine involved a variety of claims 
encompassing scores of individual issues, a trial in this 
instance would be focused on Prudential management's 
conduct. Id. Second, the court noted the class here is 
comprised of persons who purchased one type of product 
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(life insurance policies) from one company, in contrast to 
the Georgine class members who were exposed to different 
asbestos-containing products manufactured by different 
companies. Finally, the district court noted the class here 
lacked "futures" plaintiffs, because "class members are 
readily identifiable and have already suffered injury by the 
purchase of a product that was misrepresented." Id. 
 
As the Supreme Court noted in Amchem, "[p]redominance 
is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or 
securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws. . . . [e]ven 
mass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster 
may, depending upon the circumstances, satisfy the 
predominance requirement." Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250 
(citing Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 697). This 
case, involving a common scheme to defraud millions of life 
insurance policy holders, falls within that category. The 
district court's opinion sets forth a litany of common issues 
which the class must demonstrate in order to prevail. See 
supra S IV.B.1 and n.47-48. While individual questions may 
arise during the course of this litigation, we agree with the 
district court that the presence of individual questions does 
not per se rule out a finding of predominance. In particular, 
the "presence of individual questions as to the reliance of 
each investor does not mean that the common questions of 
law and fact do not predominate." Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 
F.2d 770, 786 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
Krell contends the district court did not conduct a proper 
analysis under Rule 23(b)(3), and instead "presumed" 
predominance by finding the central issue in this case was 
nationwide deceptive conduct by Prudential's management. 
We disagree. A review of the district court's fairness opinion 
belies the contention that it merely presumed 
predominance. See Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 510- 
17. The district court's finding that common issues 
predominated in this case was within its sound discretion, 
was supported by the record, and was amply demonstrated 
in its opinion. 
 
Krell also reasserts his argument that the class here 
suffers the same defects as the class of asbestos plaintiffs 
in Amchem. We find the district court's analysis of this 
comparison convincing. The two cases are markedly 
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different, and easily distinguished. The Amchem class failed 
the predominance inquiry because of the disparate 
questions facing class members, based in part on their 
differing levels of exposure, their differing medical histories, 
and the presence of exacerbating conditions such as 
smoking. Of course, the complexity of a case alleging 
physical injury as a result of asbestos exposure differs 
greatly from a case alleging economic injury as a result of 
deceptive sales practices. The elements of proof are less 
difficult when the vagaries of medical testimony and 
scientific expertise are removed from consideration. 
Furthermore, the Amchem class was further undermined by 
the schism between the differing medical needs of currently 
injured class members and exposure-only or "futures" 
claimants. As noted, there is no "futures" class in this case. 
 
We also reject Krell's contention that predominance is 
defeated because the class claims are subject to the laws of 
the fifty states. Courts have expressed a willingness to 
certify nationwide classes on the ground that relatively 
minor differences in state law could be overcome at trial by 
grouping similar state laws together and applying them as 
a unit. This Court has affirmed a class certification based 
on a "creditable showing, which apparently satisfied the 
district court, that class certification [did] not present 
insuperable obstacles" relating to variances in state law. 
See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d 
Cir. 1986).54 In this instance Krell has failed to demonstrate 
that the differences in applicable state law were sufficient to 
foreclose a similar approach.55 In support of class 
certification, plaintiffs compiled "a series of charts setting 
forth comprehensive analyses of the various states' laws 
potentially applicable to their common law claims." 
Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 525. The court 
concluded that the "elements of these common law claims 
are substantially similar and any differences fall into a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
54. While we reached a different conclusion in Georgine, our decision 
there turned on our belief that the case "could not be broken into 
anywhere near that small a number of patterns." 83 F.3d at 627 n.13. 
 
55. In addition, Krell's concern is addressed by the fact that "the ADR 
scoring procedures specifically incorporate state replacement 
regulations." Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 550 n.79. 
 
                                58 
  
limited number of predictable patterns." Id. The district 
court "considered the choice of law issues that confront[ed] 
the Court and conclude[d] that these choice of law issues 
[did] not render this class action unmanageable." Id. We 
agree. 
 
        b. Superiority 
 
Rule 23(b)(3) sets out several factors relevant to the 
superiority inquiry.56 The district court addressed these 
factors and found the class action mechanism was superior 
to other possible means of adjudicating this case. First, the 
court examined the relatively modest size of individual 
claims and the sheer volume of those claims in the 
aggregate, and concluded a class action presented the "only 
rational avenue of redress for many class members." Id. at 
523. Second, the court reasoned the relatively small 
number of individual suits pending against Prudential 
indicated that individual policyholders lacked a compelling 
interest to control the prosecution of their own claims, and 
at the same time represented a potentially great strain on 
judicial resources. Third, the court found it was appropriate 
to litigate the case in New Jersey, Prudential's principal 
place of business. Finally, the district court determined that 
the case, while challenging, would not present 
insurmountable case management problems if it were tried.57 
Id. at 525. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
56. Rule 23(b)(3) lists the following factors for consideration by the 
courts: 
 
       (A) the interest of members of the class in individually 
controlling 
       the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and 
       nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
       commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability 
       or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in 
the 
       particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the 
       management of a class action. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
57. While we believe the district court correctly analyzed whether 
application of the laws of the fifty states would be manageable, we note 
this analysis, depending on the facts in each case, may no longer be 
necessary in the context of settlement-only class certification. See 
Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248 ("Confronted with a request for settlement- 
only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the 
case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for 
the proposal is that there be no trial."). 
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Krell objects to the finding of superiority, claiming the 
district court erred by only comparing the nationwide class 
with the prospect of individual proceedings, without 
considering the possibility of subclasses and without 
allowing Krell to develop the subclass issue. 
 
The superiority requirement asks the court "to balance, 
in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class 
action against those of `alternative available methods' of 
adjudication." Georgine, 83 F.3d at 632 (citing Katz v. Carte 
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974)). We believe the court's 
superiority determination was within its sound discretion. 
With respect to Krell's subclass argument, the district court 
found no conflict between replacement and non- 
replacement claimants. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 
522. We agree. As discussed infra at S V.A.4., Krell has not 
demonstrated that replacement claimants differ from other 
class members so as to require the creation of a subclass. 
Because the replacement claimants did not require 
specialized or distinct treatment, the court's failure to 
create a separate subclass for those claimants, as well as 
its superiority determination, was not an abuse of  
discretion.58 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
Based on our review of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
and 23(b)(3), we believe the "proposed class has sufficient 
unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by 
decisions of class representatives." Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 
2248. Consequently, we will affirm the district court's 
certification of the class. 
 
V. THE FAIRNESS OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT 
 
Even if it has satisfied the requirements for certification 
under Rule 23, a class action cannot be settled without the 
approval of the court and a determination that the 
proposed settlement is "fair, reasonable and adequate."59 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
58. The district court expressly left open the possibility that it would 
create subclasses if they became necessary. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. 
Supp. at 525. 
 
59. Both Rule 23(e) and Rule 23(c) require that notice of the proposed 
settlement be given to all members of the class as directed by the court. 
For a discussion of the notice provided, see discussion infra S V.C.2. 
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G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 785. "Rule 23(e) imposes on the 
trial judge the duty of protecting absentees, which is 
executed by the court's assuring the settlement represents 
adequate compensation for the release of the class claims." 
Id. at 805 (citations omitted). 
 
In deciding the fairness of a proposed settlement, we 
have said that "[t]he evaluating court must, of course, 
guard against demanding too large a settlement based on 
its view of the merits of the litigation; after all, settlement 
is a compromise, a yielding of the highest hopes in 
exchange for certainty and resolution." Id.  at 806 (citations 
omitted). At the same time, we have noted that cases such 
as this, where the parties simultaneously seek certification 
and settlement approval, require "courts to be even more 
scrupulous than usual" when they examine the fairness of 
the proposed settlement. Id. at 805. This heightened 
standard is designed to ensure that class counsel has 
demonstrated "sustained advocacy" throughout the course 
of the proceedings and has protected the interests of all 
class members. Id. at 806. 
 
"The decision of whether to approve a proposed 
settlement of a class action is left to the sound discretion 
of the district court." Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156 
(3d Cir. 1975). Because of the district court's proximity to 
the parties and to the nuances of the litigation, we accord 
great weight to the court's factual findings. Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1305-6 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 
Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 34 
(3d Cir. 1971)). 
 
As the district court recognized, our decision in Girsh 
sets out appropriate factors to be considered when 
determining the fairness of a proposed settlement. Those 
factors are: 
 
       (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the 
       litigation . . . ; (2) the reaction of the class to the 
       settlement . . . ; (3) the stage of the proceedings and 
       the amount of discovery completed . . . ; (4) the risks 
       of establishing liability . . . ; (5) the risks of 
       establishing damages . . . ; (6) the risks of maintaining 
       the class action through trial . . . ; (7) the ability of the 
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       defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the 
       range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light 
       of the best possible recovery . . . ; (9) the range of 
       reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible 
       recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation 
       . . . . 
 
Girsh, 521 F.2d at 157 (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell 
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974)) (the "Girsh 
factors"). The court examined each of these factors and 
found "the Proposed Settlement is indeed fair, reasonable, 
and adequate and should be approved." Fairness Opinion, 
962 F. Supp. at 534. 
 
In addition to the Girsh analysis, the district court offered 
other reasons for its conclusion that the settlement was fair 
and reasonable. Describing the proposed settlement as 
"exceptional," the court noted the settlement's structure 
was based on the class action settlements approved in 
Willson v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 94-127804, 1995 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 652 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 1996), aff'd, 644 
N.Y.S.2d 617 (A.D. 1st Dep't), and Michaels v. Pheonix 
Home Life Ins. Co., No. 95-5318, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 
171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 1997), both of which received the 
praise of "[c]ourts, academic and industry experts, and 
various independent organizations." Fairness Opinion, 962 
F. Supp. at 535. The court also relied on the expertise of 
the insurance regulators from the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia, all of whom endorsed the settlement. 
 
The court found the terms of the settlement "benefit[ ] the 
class enormously," emphasizing the uncapped nature of the 
relief, the fairness of the ADR process, and the availability 
of Basic Claim Relief to those class members who either 
elect not to participate in the ADR process or who cannot 
demonstrate they have a compensable claim. The court 
found this relief was enhanced by the inclusion of 
"Additional Remediation Amounts," which it described as 
the "punitive damage counterpart to the Proposed 
Settlement," and by Prudential's agreement to pay all 
attorneys' fees and costs associated with the settlement. Id. 
at 535-36. Finally, the court emphasized the settlement 
provided class members the opportunity to file claims 
immediately after court approval of the settlement, rather 
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than waiting through what no doubt would be protracted 
litigation. Id. at 536. 
 
Krell raises several challenges to the district court's 
fairness determination.60 First, Krell claims the district 
court applied several of the Girsh factors improperly, and in 
some cases not at all, and that it erred by not creating a 
separate subclass to address replacement claims. Krell 
Brief at 43-50. Second, he contends the district court's 
fairness determination violated the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
and the Rules Enabling Act by altering the substantive 
contractual and statutory insurance rights of the class. Id. 
at 36-40. Finally, Krell alleges the certification and fairness 
proceedings lacked due process. Id. at 40-42. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
60. Prudential contends that nearly "[e]very argument Krell makes is 
based on th[e] mistaken premise that his `replacement claims' were 
stronger than the misrepresentation claims of the other Class Members." 
Prudential Brief at 41 & n.10. As a result, Prudential argues, all but one 
of the objections to the settlement's fairness are"felled by Krell's error 
of 
law." Id. We do not agree that Krell's arguments can be dismissed so 
easily, and will address Krell's replacement claim objections in the 
context of his other arguments. 
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